Oratio, Verbum, Sermo and “Les paraules de sa pensa”: Internal Discourse in Ramon Llull (1271/1272-1290), its Sources, Implications and Applications

Robert D. Hughes
Centre de Documentació Ramon Llull (Universitat de Barcelona)
robert_d_hughes@yahoo.co.uk
doi:10.3306/STUDIALULLIANA.112.03
Rebut el 8 de maig de 2017. Acceptat el 13 de juliol de 2017

Oratio, verbum, sermo i «Les paraules de sa pensa»: el discurs interior en Ramon Llull (1271/1272-1290), les fonts, les implicacions i les aplicacions

Abstract
At a time when technology companies are talking about «silent speech interfaces», it is particularly important, I believe, to look back at what the medievals said about «internal discourse» and the significatory power of concepts. In this vein, then, as much as being an «art of conversion» via dialectical argumentation and a means whereby to unite all branches of knowledge under a set of ultimate principles, Ramon Llull’s Art is an «art of contemplation», born of prayer and internal discourse at the highest levels of intellect, not least in the first phase thereof (i.e. before 1290). His Art is, therefore, the technological interface whereby internal discourse can be encoded and transmitted. By examining potential antecedents (including Aristotle, St Anselm, St Augustine, Boethius, Hugh of St Victor, St Irenaeus of Lyon, St John of Damascus, St Maximus the Confessor, Peter of Spain, Priscian, St Thomas Aquinas and William of Sherwood), as well as consequents (such as William of Ockham and Erasmus of Rotterdam), I attempt to construct a literary topography wherein to situate the statements made by Llull on the topic of internal discourse and whereby to understand how the latter, in its pre-eminent angelic form, helped to shape his thinking about the superiority of thought over the spoken and written word, a position which might suggest the presence of conceptualist elements within the realism for which he is well-known.

Keywords
Internal discourse, prayer, truth, verbum cordis, oratio, cogitatio, logos endiathetos and prophorikos

Studia lulliana 57 (2017), 3-61
http://www.msl.cat/revista/revista%20portada.htm
http://studialulliana.uib.cat
ISSN 2340 – 4752
Resum
En una època en què les companyies tecnològiques parlen d’«interfícies de parla sil·lent» penso que és especialment important mirar cap enrere i recuperar el que deien els medievals a propòsit del «discurs interior» i del poder significatiu dels conceptes. En aquesta línia, l’Art de Ramon Llull, sense deixar de ser «art de conversió» basada en l’argumentació dialèctica i una eina per unir totes les branques del saber en un de principals, és una «art de contemplació», nascuda de la pregària i del discurs interior als nivells més elevats de l’intel·lecte, com a mínim en la seva primera fase (i. e. abans de 1290). L’Art és, en aquest sentit, la interfície tecnològica que permet de codificar i transmetre el discurs interior. A través del repàs dels possibles precedents (inclouent-hi Aristòtil, sant Anselm, sant Augustí, Boeci, Hugh de Sant Víctor, Ireneu de Lió, sant Joan Damascè, sant Màxim el Confessor, Pere Hispà, Priscià, sant Tomàs d’Aquino i Guillem de Sherwood), i també dels continuadors (com ara Guilem d’Ockham i Erasme de Rotterdam), intento de construir una topografia literària per tal de situar les afirmacions de Llull sobre el motiu del discurs interior i de copsar com aquest, en la seva preeminent forma angèlica, va contribuir a afaiçoner la seva convicció de la superioritat del pensament amb relació a la paraula parlada i escrita, una posició que podria suggerir la presència d’elements conceptualistes dins del realisme que se li sol reconèixer.

Paraules clau
Discurs interior, pregària, veritat, *verbum cordis, oratio, cogitatio, logos endiathetos* i *prophorikos*

Summary
1. Introduction
2. The Latin tradition and its implications for Ramon Llull
   2.1. Thought, prayer and truth, and the precedence of mental over vocal speech
   2.2. Ramon Llull: The “semantic triangle” and demonstration
   2.3. The *Llibre dels àngels* and the *Liber de locutione angelorum*
3. Ramon Llull and the Greek tradition
   3.1 *Logos endiathetos* and *logos prophorikos*
   3.2. The *Romanç d’Evast e Blaquerna*
4. Conclusion

Studia lulliana 57 (2017), 3-61
http://www.msl.cat/revista/revista%20portada.htm
http://studialulliana.uib.cat
ISSN 2340 – 4752
1. Introduction¹

I should like to begin by considering the broad hermeneutical framework offered by Hans-Georg Gadamer in his *Wahrheit und Methode*, a work wherein he views the relationship between words, things and thoughts through the prism of a fundamental contrast between language and *logos* (as conceived by Greek philosophy under the influence largely of Plato’s *Cratylus* and, in lesser part, the *Sophist*, both of which texts, however, were unavailable to medieval thinkers)² and Patristic and Scholastic—that is to say, specifically Christian—understandings of language vis-à-vis the concept of *verbum*.³ According to this author’s account, words, for the early Greek philosophers, constituted no more than names and thereby failed to represent true being; instead, they were conceived as substitutes for things.⁴

Plato’s *Cratylus*, in Gadamer’s view, holds that words and things correspond to each other either: a) conventionally through unambiguous usage sanctioned by agreement and practise, by which convention is assigned the sole source of a word’s meaning;⁵ or b) by the natural agreement (or resemblance)

---

¹ I should like to thank the Institut Ramon Llull (IRL) for providing financial assistance enabling me to present an earlier version of this article at Magdalen College, Oxford as part of the “Llull Year” (l’Any Llull) colloquium, “Celebrating Ramon Llull in Oxford”, co-organized by the IRL and Dr Juan-Carlos Conde of the Magdalen Iberian Medieval Studies Seminar (MIMSS) on 25th November 2016. I should also like to thank Dr Celia López Alcalde for providing me with a number of Lullian texts otherwise unavailable to me, and to thank Drs Josep Enric Rubio and Alexander Fidora for reading an earlier draft or drafts of this article. Both of the latter also alerted me to the existence of material not known to me, for which I am grateful. Josep Rubio’s comments have been very helpful, and although I argue against certain of his points in the interests of maintaining consistency as to the lines of argument pursued in this article, I have found his considered opinion altogether very persuasive. The reader should also note that I only received a copy of Rubio (2017a) on the very day of the final submission of this article. All translations are my own unless otherwise stated. Unfortunately, I have not had access to St Thomas Aquinas’s *Expositio libri Perihermenias. Editio altera retractata*, R.-A. Gauthier (ed.), Rome/Paris, Commission Leonina: J. Vrin, 1989, and again for the sake of consistency, quote from Roberto Busa’s edition of St Thomas’s works. Despite repeated attempts in British research libraries, I was also unable to access a copy of the CCCM edition of St Augustine’s *De trinitate*.

² Until the twelfth century the only work of Plato’s to be transmitted to the Latin west was a version by Cicero (106 BC-43 BC) of the *Timaeus* and a later translation of the first part thereof (i.e. as far as 53c) by Calcidius (fl. 4th century). There were also translations of the *Phaedo* and *Meno* by Henry Aristippus of Catania (1105/1110-1162), although these were little read, as well as of sections of the *Parmenides*. In the thirteenth century William of Moerbeke translated the Neoplatonist Proclus’s (412-485 AD) commentary on the *Parmenides* into Latin, a translation which was widely read during the Middle Ages. For Proclus’s commentary, see ‘Conclusion’.

³ Gadamer (2004, 406-426). I owe this reference to one of the anonymous referees of this article.

⁴ Ibid., 406.

⁵ Ibid., 406-407.
between a word and a thing as characterised by its ‘correctness’. These two theories, though not mutually exclusive, were limited, in Gadamer’s view, by their reliance upon notions of the ‘existence and instrumentality of words’. The *Cratylus*, again in Gadamer’s view, seeks to deny to language the ability to access truth in favour of a theory of the direct apprehension of a thing from itself, wordlessly. In this way, the true object of thought becomes the realm of ideas.

In this context, *logos* (or the soul’s discourse with itself; also ‘speech’) can be either true or false, such truth or falsity seemingly being dependent on correct or incorrect usage. Unlike in ancient times, therefore, when the unity of word and thing was beyond doubt, and a word was equivalent to a name, a true name forming part of the bearer’s name itself, for Plato, *logos* per se, which flowed from thought, was the bearer of truth (or error).

From Gadamer’s counter-Enlightenment perspective, then, language as conceived by the Greek philosophers possessed merely the secondary instrumentality of the sign, instrumentality whereby any being attributable to the former fell under the dominion of thought. For Gadamer, however, the Christian mystery of the Incarnation represents a radical reversal of such reduction of language to ideality as achieved by the Greek concept of *logos*. Through its emphasis upon the relationship between human speech and thought and the centrality thereof to Trinitarian theology, medieval thinking on the Incarnation, for Gadamer, represents the full realisation of spirit via the enfleshment, though not embodiment, of the Word, and the freeing of *logos* from the realms of spirituality/ideality.

Gadamer considers the analogical reflection of the intra-Trinitarian relation of Filiation in those of thought/word and *logos endiathetos/logos prophorikos*, as developed by the Church Fathers, to have performed a crucial role in

---

6 Ibid., 407.
7 Id. The general lines of Gadamer’s argument stress that language and language usage (e.g. speech, ‘inner’ or ‘outer’) should be considered as an ‘event’ rather than as a ‘tool’.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Ibid., 412.
11 Ibid., 406.
12 Ibid., 412.
13 Ibid., 414-417.
14 Ibid., 418.
situating ‘the problem of language […] entirely within inner thought’. In this respect, certain works of Augustine (discussed below) play a major part, insofar as, in Gadamer’s eyes, his notion of a *verbum cordis* (or true word) is completely independent of such a *verbum*’s sensory appearance within any given language; it is, in fact, the image or mirror of the divine Word. Nonetheless, although this Augustinian concept effectively undermines the role of the proliferation of languages and the value of outward speech, these latter are not omitted from discussion completely. Gadamer further highlights the importance of Augustine’s particular elucidation of the mystery of the Trinity, whereby the *verbum* as inner word is closely related to ‘reason’ (*intellectus*), and a correspondence is brought out between the relationship of human thought to speech and intra-Trinitarian relationships themselves (*circumincessio*). In these latter respects, then, the ‘inner word’, for Augustine, represents more than simply the soul’s discourse with itself.

Gadamer goes on to interpret the thinking of High Scholasticism with regard to the word as a form of reversion to the classical concept of the *logos*, under the influence of Aristotelianism. He sees Thomas Aquinas as failing to give a proper account of the range of languages, though concedes that St Thomas does not go as far as completely to equate *logos* and *verbum*. For Aquinas, the inner word is defined by its relation to possible utterance, and within the intellect has an *ordinatio ad alterum*, and consists in its subject matter being thoroughly thought through (*forma excogitata*) via inquiry (*inquisitio*) and ‘thoughtfulness’ (*cogitatio*), the latter of which is a term common in Ramon Llull’s works, as discussed below.

It is also to be noted that three of the terms used in the title of this article, namely, *oratio*, *verbum* and *sermo* constitute renderings considered synonymous with the Greek term *logos*, as found in the Septuagint, within the Latin

---

15 Ibid., 419. For these aspects, see below §§ 2 (text at nn. 63-65 and 83) and 3.1.
16 Ibid., 420. For the works of St Augustine relevant in this respect, see below §§ 2 (after nn. 65, 71, 85) and 2.1 (at n. 120).
17 Ibid., 419-420. For Ramon Llull’s consideration of the multiplicity of tongues in the context of both ‘internal discourse’ and outward mission, see below, end of § 2.2.
18 For discussion of St Augustine’s *De trinitate* etc., see above, n. 16, and below, § 2.2 (at n. 139).
19 Ibid., 421.
20 Ibid., 421.
21 Id.
22 Id. In the conclusion to this article I shall be both situating Ramon Llull’s writings within the context of Gadamer’s thesis and calling into question some of the claims made therein.
Vulgate Bible. (The same Greek term was likewise often rendered into Latin by translators as *ratio* or *argumentum*, conveying the sense of ‘argument’ or ‘line of reasoning’.) In this context and others, they convey in English the various senses of “speech”, “the word”, “discourse” and “conversation”, and even “language” and “disputation”, among other such. The correctness of the Vulgate’s choices as regards the Latin translation of the Greek term, particularly with reference to John 1:1, however, would eventually become, at the height of Humanist inquiry, the subject of a celebrated controversy, as is manifested by the two versions of Erasmus of Rotterdam’s *Apologia de In principio erat sermo*, both of which versions (A and B) first appeared in 1520 in defence of his use of the variant *sermo* for *verbum* in the second edition of his New Testament of 1519. “Les paraules de sa pensa”, on the other hand, is the turn of phrase Ramon Llull most commonly uses to denote human “internal discourse” or thought and provides a possible direct correlate for and translation of the scholastic term *verbum mentis*, used to signify ideas or concepts.

In this article, however, I should like to argue that, in at least the early formulations (or “Ternary Phase”) of his Art, namely, between 1271/1272 and 1290, Ramon Llull formalises the pre-linguistic principles and conditions discovered in and through thought, consideration, cogitation, prayer and contemplation, that is to say, “internal discourse”. He ensures, in turn, I believe, that these principles and conditions themselves come to form the basis of all discourse, whether internal or external. By doing so, Llull was, in part, responding to the Aristotelian stratagem of basing demonstration upon logic, namely, “internal discourse” par excellence, though also to the Augustinian notion of “knowledge accompanied by love” (*cum amore notitia*).

Thus, if the principles and conditions of Llull’s Art were to occupy a similar status in relation to his system of thought as did syllogistic logic in relation to that of Aristotle, they too could found an art of demonstration, and thereby

---

23 Ammonius (1961, lxxx).
24 Erasmus (1706).
25 The sixth-century Latin grammarian Priscian was instrumental in introducing to the Middle Ages the notion that *vox* (vocal sound or the spoken word) indicated a *mentis conceptum* (or mental concept), which he also called *cogitatio*; cf. Cassin et al. (2014, 165). In the context of the logical and semantic dimensions of Thomas Aquinas’ metaphysics of substance, however, *vox significativa* or meaningful vocal sound has a *significatio* which “supposits for” (i.e. stands for) its *significatum* (i.e. the thing meant); cf. Murê (2013, 209). As Rubio trenchantly affirms, in Llull’s writings, prayer and contemplation are coincident concepts and practices, in Rubio (2017a, 109-112).
26 Augustine (1997a, 102), *De trinitate*, IX, 10, 15.
produce causal knowledge, as well as an art of loving God, neighbour and self. In arguing thus, I seek to establish the continuity and interpenetration between the contemplative and demonstrative aspects of Llull’s writings, as also between knowledge and love, and thought and language therein.

In the latter respect, this continuity only comes into being, I would suggest, as a result of his efforts to overcome what he perceives to be a fundamental epistemic and ontological gap between “internal” and “external discourse”, to which end, some six years after 1290, Llull would formulate his theory of *affatus* or oral communication, as a sixth sense, in contrast to Aristotle’s categorical denial in his *De anima* of the existence of such. Aristotle, in fact, clearly states (in translation) that “there is no [sixth] sense in addition to the five [enumerated]—sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch”.

In the medieval period, the standard criterion for distinguishing between internal and external discourse was to be found in such a discourse’s *ordinatio ad alterum*, that is to say, its being addressed to another.28 *Oratio* (as outward speech) was traditionally so distinguished, however, only *secundum rationem*, or according to reason, rather than to reality.29 This meant that a concept was equiv-

---

27 Aristotle (1995a, 675), *De anima*, III, 1, 424b22: “Non existere ullum alienum sensum praeter istos quinque (loquor de visu, auditu, odoratu, gustu, tactu) potest ex considerationibus, quae sequuntur, deduci [...”, in Aristotle (1957, 215). There is an extensive literature on Llull’s *affatus*, with which, for the purposes of this article, I will assume the reader is familiar. This literature includes (to mention but a few examples) Dagenais (1983, 107-121); Johnston (1990a, 3-30, 139-159); Johnston (1990b, 39-44); Pistolesi (1996, 3-45); and Pistolesi (1998, 73-92). Rubio summarises and, to an extent, supersedes the foregoing references in Rubio (2017a, 45-51).

28 We should also note, however, that in *De fallaciis*, Prologue, a work possibly by Thomas Aquinas, the very same criterion is used to distinguish *argumentatio* plain and simple from *disputatio*: “Sed ratiocinatio quae est ad alterum, non solum est syllogismus vel argumentatio, sed disputatio”, in Aquinas (1980a, 575). In his discussions on the nature of *verbum*, Aquinas does, in fact, note the distinction in respect of internal and external discourse in another work of greater importance, namely, *In I Sent.* d. 27, q. 2, a. 1 co., where he states: “Sed tamen sciendum est, quod in operationibus intellectus est quidam gradus. Primo enim est simplex intuitus intellectus in cognitione intelligibilis, et hoc nondum habet rationem verbi. Secundo est ibi ordinatio illius intelligibilis ad manifestationem vel alterius, secundum quod aliquis alteri loquitur, vel sui ipsius, secundum quod contingit aliquem etiam sibi ipsi loqui, et haec primo accipit rationem verbi; unde verbum nihil aliud dicit quam quamdam emanationem ab intellectu per modum manifestantis”, in Aquinas (1980b, 74). At this point in his text, Aquinas distinguishes between four levels of *verbum*: 1) simple intuition in intelligible cognition; 2) *verbum cordis*; 3) *verbum interius quod habet imaginationem vocis*; and 4) *verbum vocis* itself. For the latter information, cf. Rosier-Catach (2009, 77). In ‘De verbo’, q. 4, art. 1, resp., of his *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, very probably a private disputation conducted as a young Master at the University of Paris between 1256-1259, Thomas distinguishes simply between: 1) *verbum cordis*; 2) *verbum exemplar exterioris vocis* (= *verbum interius quod habet imaginationem vocis*); and 3) *verbum vocis* (= *verbum exterius expressum*), for which see Aquinas (1992, 30).

29 The terms *oratio* (in Latin) and *oració* (in Catalan) convey in their respective languages at least the three following senses: discourse or speech; sentence or clause expressing a complete sense; and prayer. In the course of this article, I shall be calling on all three of these senses.
lent in function to a sign, and thus may have been suggestive to Llull of the possibility of a purely intellectual, though outwardly significative, form of “internal discourse”, wherein thoughts themselves, rather than terms, had the capacity for reference. Another term which was common among Latin authors to indicate speech or discourse is *sermo*, related as this is to the medieval *ars sermocinallis* whereby logic or dialectic is viewed as the art of discourse or argumentation. From the very earliest point in his production, namely the *Compendium logicae Algazelis* (1271-1272 ?), translated into Catalan verse as the *Lògica del Gatzell*, Ramon Llull makes use of the term *sermo* (or *sermó* in Catalan) to denote the broadest category of statements of which logical propositions form part and which are subject to a criterion of truth and falsity.

I should further like to argue that the traditional medieval equation of knowledge with contemplation, combined with St Augustine’s own equation of knowledge, that is to say, man’s entire knowledge, both contemplative and active, with truth, might have suggested to Llull that contemplation itself could be equated with truth, and that the discovery of truth was an art, indeed an art of contemplation itself. The foregoing has explanatory force throughout Llull’s writing career, given that between 1273-1274 and 1313 he composed a variety of works (or parts thereof) either bearing in their title the term contemplation or concerning that very topic.

For Ramon Llull, things, thoughts, (written or spoken) words and, particularly, actions which are concordant with the divine attributes—attributes which themselves serve as the principles of his onto-theo-logical system and

30 For further discussion of the senses attributed to the term oratio by both Priscian and the medieval logicians William of Sherwood and Peter of Spain, cf. below, § 2, this article, and notes, esp. nn. 51 and 52. For the relation of St Thomas Aquinas to the *logica moderna* represented by the writings of, not least, the two latter authors and for the passage from theories of signification via theories of supposition to Aquinas’s own theory equating signs with concepts, cf. Gaukroger (1978, 137-138).

31 Lohr (1967, 93-130); this text contains an edition of Llull’s *Compendium logicae Algazelis*; ORL XIX, 1-62. The term *sermó* occurs 21 times in the course of the Catalan version of the text.


33 Augustine (1997a, 464), *De trinitate* XV, 10, 17; and *PL* 42:1069-1070, here 1070: “Nunc ergo simul de universa scientia hominis loquimur, in qua nobis nota sunt quaecumque sunt nota: quae utique vera sunt, aliquin nota non essent. Nemo enim falsa novit, nisi cum falsa esse novit: quod si novit, verum novit; verum est enim quod illa falsa sint.”

34 *Llibre de contemplació en Déu* (1273-1274 ?); *Oracions e contemplacions de l’enteniment* (1274-1276 ?); “Art de contemplació” (Montpellier, 1276-1283 ?), ch. 101 of the *Romanç d’Evast e Blaquerna*; *De contemplatione Raymundi* (Paris, Aug 1297), containing parts entitled “Quomodo possimus Deum contemplari” (= “De decem modis contemplandi Deum”) and “Quomodo contemplatio transit in raptum” (= “De raptu”) among others; and *Liber de compendiosa contemplatione* (Messina, May 1313).
are governed therein by certain conditions—are considered exemplary, while those which are contrary thereto are considered anathema. We should not forget either that the Lullian project as outlined above, grounded in thought and contemplation, as it is, also requires of itself that it be communicable, communicable, that is, on a universal scale.

Anthropologically speaking, for Llull, man, the noblest of creatures, is an ambiguous and ambivalent figure, ambiguous externally and semiotically and ambivalent internally, that is to say, ontologically and morally. Such ambiguity and ambivalence requires order if it is to be resolved, and such order derives from Llull’s God-focused doctrine of intentions. According to this doctrine, man’s “first intention”, as Llull calls it, namely, his ultimate purpose, is to know, love, honour, serve and praise God, while his “second intention” consists in any means which contributes to the attainment of that end.\(^{35}\) Man’s constitution as both a sensible and an intellectual being, however, does not necessarily result in a dichotomy, as these aspects of his nature are mediated by his imaginative faculty as well as by his five “spiritual senses”, which exist in addition to the three mental powers of the soul (i.e., memory, intellect and will), and include, in Llull’s listing: subtlety, cogitation, apperception, conscience and courage (or fervour).\(^{36}\)

These “spiritual senses”, possessing apprehensive functions, have their roots in a number of traditions which Llull merges to create something novel. They are not simply based, therefore, on those of Avicenna, who, in his *De anima*, identified five internal senses, namely, the *sensus communis*, imagination, cogitation, estimation and memory, though Avicenna does, in fact, feature among the writers upon whom Llull drew.\(^{37}\) Moreover, as Llull states

---

\(^{35}\) Cf., most recently, Ruiz Simon (2002).

\(^{36}\) Only in the very final stages of preparing this article, have I discovered that Amador Vega has previously written at some length on the role of the imagination in Llull’s theory of “contemplative prayer”, cf. Vega (2005, 157-178). There is some overlap in our concerns, though our focus and emphasis differ. Vega’s article stresses the crucial role played by the imagination in the ascent from sensible to intellectual signification in Llull, and he points to the importance of the four modes of such signification from which what Llull calls a “secret” emerges, modes Llull sets out in the *Compendium logicae Algazelis/Lògica del Gatzell* as follows: sensible → sensible, sensible → intellectual, intellectual → intellectual, intellectual → sensible, the latter, through its descent, completing the circle, in what Llull calls a return from the theoretical to the practical; cf. ORL XIX, 29-30. In this article, it is the third such level which attracts the majority of my attention, a level at which the five “spiritual senses” come into play.

\(^{37}\) For a fuller account of eclectic sources underlying Llull’s recourse to the Arabic-Peripatetic tradition pertaining to the “internal senses” and its Patristic counterpart pertaining to the “spiritual senses” in the *Liber contemplationis*, as well as Llull’s original treatment of such material, whereby the traditional components are subsumed in unison within the framework of contemplation, cf. (in German) Germann
in Chapter 151, § 28 of his *Llibre de contemplació en Déu* (1273-1274 ?; hereafter *LC*), it is precisely man’s composite nature, as body conjoined with soul, that enables a person to cogitate upon nature itself, while that person’s soul alone is what equips him or her to cogitate upon God’s works *ad intra*, namely, the dynamism of His essence.\(^{38}\)

So long as man’s lower faculties are ordered towards their higher counterparts, so long as, that is, the senses remain subordinate to the intellect and its powers and are themselves curbed, and so long as these powers of the intellect are ordered towards man’s “first intention”, the disorder of evil, sin and the vices can be avoided and the order of goodness and virtue fostered and maintained.

To refer to a different aspect of Llull’s thought, however, it is clear that the correlative theory, which made its earliest appearance in his *Lectura super figuras Artis demonstrativae*,\(^{39}\) composed in around 1285-1287, namely, the theory deriving from his conceptualisation of Trinitarian dynamism in terms of the latter’s active, passive and conjunctive components, and the application thereof throughout the entire created order, also finds partial expression via his relatively late introduction of definitions for the concepts he employs, definitions introduced in the *Ars inventiva veritatis* (hereafter *AIV*) of 1290.\(^{40}\) Two such definitions are very well known, namely, those of God and Man. The first he defines as follows: *Deus est ens deitans*; the second, as: *homo est homificans ens* or *animal homificans*.\(^{41}\) Worth noting is the fact that Lullian

\(^{38}\) ORL IV, 310. For the role of the five senses in human knowledge of the divine within Llull’s *Liber contemplationis*, cf. Burnett (2011, 181-208). I am indebted to Alexander Fidora for this reference. For the importance of the bodily senses in (and of visual and verbal models for) the contemplation of the divine, cf. Rubio (2015) and Rubio (2016).

\(^{39}\) MOG IV, iii (17-224).

\(^{40}\) MOG V, i (1-211); ROL XXXVII.

\(^{41}\) Grammatical theologians in the thirteenth century tended to view the proper nouns *deitas* and *humanitas* as “essential terms” in that they signified essentially; cf. Robb (1993, ch. 5, § 2, 130-143, here 133).
definitions are generated not by genus and *differentia*, but spring from the concept under consideration as regards the dynamism of its being and essence.

Such Lullian definitions, clearly very distinct from the traditional medieval ones deriving from that of Porphyry, *Isagoge*, III, 8, to the effect that man is a “rational mortal animal”,

\[42\] nevertheless take their cue from precisely such, insofar as they represent Llull’s way of conceptualising and resolving the apparent paradox that Christ is a man, insofar as He has a human nature, but is nevertheless immortal, in His divinity. Such definitions also enable Llull to begin to situate discussion of Christ at a level comparable to that of the universal rather than solely at that of His singular and perceptible *figura*, a feature assiciable solely with His human nature.

In Chapter 155 of *LC*, in fact, Llull categorises the Porphyrian style of definition in respect of man as being “literal” rather than “spiritual”, and it is also in the light of this that we should view his own style thereof.

\[43\] It is worth mentioning in this respect that Llull’s relatively late turn to definitions may well find its source in St Anselm’s *Monologion*, Chapters 10 and 11, wherein Anselm moves away from the singularity of similitudes or likenesses as the basis of the “speech of the mind” (*locutio mentis*) towards a reliance on universalising definitions.

\[44\] Such definitions are, by their nature, formed of words, and point, in Anselm, to the establishing of a connection between *internal* discourse and *linguistic* discourse,

\[45\] a connection which, as we shall see, St Augustine had resolutely excluded.

\[46\] If the Anselmian influence upon Llull in this respect, prior to the latter’s introduction of definitions into his Art, is plausible, then this would suggest that Llull himself may have started to move away from a pre-linguistic construal of “internal discourse” to one which was more broadly linguistic, albeit that such “language” was itself reliant upon the spiritually conceived content expressed thereby.

Having said this, however, Llull, in fact, introduces a distinction between *two* types of “internal discourse” as generated by the soul, one intellectual, the other sensible, in Question 54 of his *QADS*, written in 1289. The distinction itself is based upon the respective objects of the soul’s intentionality, whether

---

\[42\] Porphyry (1975, 46).
\[43\] ORL IV, 333.
\[44\] Hurand (2009, 37).
\[45\] Cf. ibid., 42.
\[46\] Cf. ibid., 43.
these be, for example, God, an angel, the soul or memory, or the very goodness of the foregoing, or whether they be the mental images or likenesses of sensible things.\textsuperscript{47}

Although Llull’s consistent focus is upon the complete human being, body and soul, and the compass of his thought broad enough to include every gradation of being, from the elemental level to that of the divine, it is also true that he consistently holds a Bonaventuran view of \textit{synderesis} vis-à-vis the created world, whereby all beings have a natural inclination towards the good, both in terms of their signification and their volitional and ontological directedness. This means that sensible (or perceptible) things optimally tend to signify their intellectual counterparts, that is to say, the \textit{sensualitats} or sensible natures apprehended by the mind optimally tend to signify their corresponding \textit{intellectualitats} or intellectual natures.\textsuperscript{48}

This inclination also finds expression (Neoplatonically) in the desire each being has for its ontological perfection and finds echoes also, as Charles Lohr has noted, in thought of St Anselm, in whose dynamic conception of reality each being has an active tendency towards the infinite.\textsuperscript{49} For the above reasons and for the sake of argument, as well as for reasons of space, this article will disregard the nonetheless important strand of “sensible internal discourse” in order to concentrate upon its “intellectual” counterpart. I shall simply add here that it is my suspicion that the Lullian inclusion of \textit{cogitatio} (often equated in his writings with the sense of “meditation”) among the “spiritual senses” establishes this “sense” as the specific bi-directional link between the human intellect and Llull’s “sixth sense”, \textit{affatus} or the capacity for oral communication.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{MOG} IV, iii, 76 (93).
\textsuperscript{48} Cf. above, n. 36.
\textsuperscript{49} Lohr (1988, 2).
\textsuperscript{50} As the reader will see, in his—at the time of writing—forthcoming book, Josep Enric Rubio has made important comments to the effect that the Lullian \textit{affatus} can be seen as the human alternative to angelic speech (for which, see below, §§ 2, 22-23; 2.1., 28-29; 2.3., 33-34), insofar as it is bound to be a sense, given that we are sensual animals, but that, as a sense, it connects with the intellect, which we possess on account of our being also rational animals. In Rubio’s view, therefore, such sensory support is needed for communication, and communication of the Art in particular; cf. Rubio (2017a, 20ff, 45-51). The foregoing seems sensible, though to me seems to underplay efforts on Llull’s part to get beyond human speech and the written text to the realms of \textit{intellectus}, superior as this is, in his view, to either speech or the written word.
2. The Latin tradition and its implications for Ramon Llull

We should note first of all that, outside its strictly religious connotations, the term *oratio* was received by the medievals from the context, first, of its early study by the Latin grammarian Priscian, in Book XVII of his *Institutiones grammaticae*. This particular section of Priscian’s text, along with Book XVIII, formed a central part of the curriculum at the University of Paris during the thirteenth century. A second context for its reception consisted in the discussion of *oratio* by the terminist logicians William of Sherwood and Peter of Spain, the field of logic (or dialectic) by the mid-thirteenth century having come to subsume—and even supersede—that of grammar for investigations within the Arts faculty into the philosophy of language, if not also, within the faculty of Theology, into matters theological. We should not assume, however, that Ramon Llull either coincided in his treatment of this theme or shared the respective aims of the two abovementioned traditions of thought within the *trivium*. Though Llull may not have become familiar with the works of the above terminists until his first stay in Paris in 1287-1289, the presence of their writings within academic

---

51 Priscian’s *Institutionum grammaticum libri XVIII*, Book 2, § 4 (in particular), defines the term as “Oratio est ordinatio dictionum congrua, sententiam perfectam demonstrans [...]”, the term *dictio* having itself been defined, in ibid., Book 2, § 3, as “dictio est pars minima orationis constructae, id est in ordine compositae [...]”, both in Priscian (1961b, 53); cf. William of Sherwood (1966, 23, n. 6). Whether the formal or semantic criterion regarding the readings *congrua*/*congruam* was uppermost in Priscian’s mind is open to debate; cf. Cassin et al. (2014, 867). Interestingly, from the point of view of the “syntax” of the Lullian Arts, in the opening lines of Book 17, § 1 of the same work, Priscian states that “quemadmodum literae apte coëuntes faciunt syllabas et syllabae dictiones, sic et dictiones orationem”, in Priscian (1961a, 108); cf. also Priscian (2010, 62). As Sven Öhman comments, however, a degree of caution should be used if translating *oratio* as “speech” in the first quotation above from Priscian, cf. Öhman (2002, 105).

52 William of Sherwood (1983, 224); Latin; William of Sherwood (1966, 25); English; Peter of Spain (1972, 2-3); Peter of Spain (2014, 104-106/105-107); Latin/English. The former defines *oratio* (“an expression” or “a phrase”) as a “vox significativa ad placitum, cuius partes separatae significant”, namely, an utterance (thus falling under the rubric of significant vocal sound) significant by convention (*ad placitum*) whose parts are also independently significant, while the latter, concurring, repeats the definition almost verbatim. For both William of Sherwood and Peter of Spain, *orationes*, as utterances significant by convention, are complex examples thereof, William of Sherwood (1983, 223); Latin; William of Sherwood (1966, 22-23); English; Peter of Spain (1972, 2); Peter of Spain (2014, 102/103); Latin/English, and therefore include sentences, phrases and clauses. Cf. also, Batalla (forthcoming), “Introduction”, 1. *Scientia sermo-cinalis*. Any reference to “grammar” in the writings of Llull must take account of his own multilingualism and the multilingualism he pragmatically desired for the propagation of the faith failing the universal prevalence of a language such as Latin. Llull’s own comments on grammar, dispersed throughout his works, are well known and have been summarised in Colom Mateu (1973, 57-60). Llull’s positions on grammar have also been comprehensively discussed in Badia (1989, 157-182). For an attempt to relate the significations of Figure T of Llull’s Art to medieval speculative grammar, cf. Platzeck (1953-1954, 35-49).

53 For a cogent account of the correlation between the modes of the *trivium* (rhetoric, grammar and dialectic) and, respectively, the writings of Saints Augustine, Anselm and Thomas Aquinas, as well as of the similarities and differences between the theories of signification and the epistemologies expressed thereby, cf. Gaukroger (1978, 134-136; 138).
milieux prior to that date would, at least, have served to influence the manner in which Ramon Llull’s own writings were received.

Having said that, we should note secondly the historiographical problem posed by the fact that Ramon Llull consistently, and with only rare exception, avoided reference to the sources or auctoritates he used in preparing to write any of his works.

Nevertheless, Aristotle’s account of the various kinds of speech in his *Peri hermeneias* or *De interpretatione* states:

Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of—affections of the soul—are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses of—actual things—are also the same.54

In this connection, Stephan Meier-Oeser claims that while Aristotle makes a clear distinction between mental concepts and spoken language, like Plato, he describes the act of thinking as one of internal speech, citing Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, 1009a20, wherein a contrast is set up between a person’s “thought” or “mental outlook” and another person’s “theory” or “argument” as expressed in words or speech. According to this author, then, “internal discourse” provides the basis for “signification, logical argumentation and demonstration” in Aristotle, and also provides the primary and proper locus of truth and falsehood.55

Thomas Aquinas’ commentary on the passage, in his *In libros Peri hermeneias expositio*, composed between 1269-1272, moreover, offers clarification

---

54 Aristotle (1995b, 25), J. L. Ackrill (tr.), *De interpretatione* 1, 16a3-8: “Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae, et ea quae scribuntur eorum quae sunt in voce. Et que-madmodum nec litterae omnibus eadem, sic nec eadem voces; quorum autem hae primorum notae, eadem omnibus passiones animae sunt, et quorum hae similitudines, res etiam eadem”, “Translatio boethii”, in Aristoteles latinus (1965, 5); “Sunt quidem igitur que in voce earum quae in anima passionum symbola et que scibuntur eorum que in voce. Et sicut neque littere omnibus eadem, sic neque voces eadem; quorum tamen hec signa primum, eadem omnibus passiones anime, et quorum hee similitudines, res iam eedem”, “Translatio guillelmi de moerbeka (Recensio ammoniana)”, ibid., 41. The term *interpretatio* is glossed itself in Boethian terms by Thomas Aquinas as “vox significativa [significant vocal sound, as distinct from the natural sounds of animals], quae per se aliquid significat, sive sit complexa sive incomplexa”, Aquinas (1980c, 327), Pro., 3. *Interpretatio*, on this view, therefore, includes nouns, verbs and sentences (orationes), but excludes conjunctions and prepositions, cf. id. As Martin Lenz points out, the likenesses (or similitudes) in question here were viewed after 1250 “no longer solely […] as similitudes of things but as mental signs”, Lenz (2008, 303).

55 Meier-Oeser (2011, 149-150). For elucidations of the function of “internal discourse” in many of these latter respects within the writings of Ramon Llull, see below (this article), §§ 2.1 and 2.2.
as to the sense in which Aristotle might have intended the phrase “affections in the soul”. Thomas distinguishes customary understandings of the sense of *passiones animae* as “the affections of the sensitive appetite, like anger and joy, and the other passions that are commonly and usually called passions of the soul” from the “vocal sounds that are significant by human institution” of which Aristotle is speaking here.\(^56\) Thomas goes on to say that “‘passions in the soul’ must be understood here as conceptions of the intellect, and names, verbs, and speech, signify these conceptions of the intellect immediately according to the teaching of Aristotle”, concluding that Aristotle “calls all of the operations of the soul ‘passions’ of the soul. Whence even the conception of the intellect can be called a passion [...]”.\(^57\) Notably, therefore, Aristotle assigns precedence to thought over the conventions of spoken or written language.\(^58\)

We should also take the time to compare such a conceptualisation with the triple sense ascribed to *oration* (or outward speech) by Boethius in his commentaries on Aristotle:

> There are said by the Peripatetics to be three types of speech: one which may be written with letters; another which may be uttered verbally; and a third which may be composed in the mind. And if there are three types of speech, there is no doubt that the parts of speech are also threefold. Hence, because the verb and the noun are the principal parts of speech, there will be some verbs and nouns which are written, others which are spoken and others [still] which are treated silently in the mind.\(^59\)

Echoing Aristotle, Boethius goes on to specify that which is signified by spoken speech, saying that “these verbs and nouns which are uttered in spoken speech signify (*denuntiant*) the affections in the soul”.\(^60\) In addition to this, he also affirms the significatory role of concepts, stating that: “Concepts them-

\(^{56}\) Aquinas (1980c, 327), I, 2, 5: “Circa id autem quod dicit, earum quae sunt in anima passionum, considerandum est quod passiones animae communiter dici solent appetitus sensibilis affectiones, sicut ira, gaudium et alia huusmodi”; id.: “Sed nunc sermo est de vocibus significativis ex institutione humana.”

\(^{57}\) Id.: “et ideo oportet passiones animae hic intelligere intellectus conceptiones, quas nomina et verba et orationes significat immediate, secundum sententiam Aristotelis”; id., I, 2, 6: “Sed manifeste inventur in 1 de anima quod passiones animae vocat omnes animae operationes. Unde et ipsa conceptio intellectus passio dici potest.”

\(^{58}\) Lenz (2008, 304).

\(^{59}\) Boethius (1987a, 30, ll. 3-10): “dictum est tres esse apud Peripateticos orationes, unam quae litteris scirberetur, aliam quae proferretur in voce, tertia quae coniungeretur in animo. Quod si tres orationes sunt, partes quoque orationis esse triplices nulla dubitatio est. Quare quoniam verbum et nomen pricipaliter orationis partes sunt, erunt alia verba et nomina quae scribantur, alia quae dicantur, alia quae tacita mente tractentur”; for different translations of this passage, cf. Suto (2011, 77-78).

\(^{60}\) Id., ll. 20-21: “ea verba et nomina quae in vocali oratione proferuntur animae passiones denuntiant”.
selves, however, are significative of nothing other than things”. Boethius, in respect of the above, has been interpreted as defining thought linguistically, insofar as the parts of speech themselves appear to be present in the thoughts of the mind. It is possible to moderate such a conclusion, however, if one takes into account the fact that, as one recent author writes, “Boethius’ mental speech has a language-like structure, i.e., compositionality, but does not belong to any particular language”.

A further writer of significance with regard to the tradition on “internal discourse” as also to Ramon Llull, though writing in Greek, was John of Damascus, particularly his De fide orthodoxa, whose distinctions were taken up in the thirteenth century by Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, for which reason I mention him first of all under the heading of the Latin tradition (cf. also, below, § 3.1., this article). In Book I, Chapter 13 of the aforementioned work, John makes a primary distinction between the divine and human manifestations of the logos, which human manifestations conform to a triad involving: a) a natural movement of the mind, by which it moves, thinks and reasons; b) internal thought [or logos endiathetos] as spoken in the heart; and c) the spoken word [or logos prophorikos] itself, which serves to convey the mind’s messages, and is the means by which humans communicate their internal thoughts. Thomas Aquinas refers directly to this passage in his Scriptum super libros Sententiarum (Commentary on the Sentences) and his Summa theologiae, in which latter, following Albertus Magnus, he identifies logos endiathetos with what he calls imaginatio vocis, itself defined as the mental representation of external words by the imagination, a process nevertheless dependent upon a particular language (which was not the case within the Greek tradition).

Two other important writers with respect to Llull’s thinking about “internal discourse” are perhaps inevitable in any well-read medieval theological and philosophical thinker. The first of these is St Augustine, in whose writings, particularly Book XV of his De trinitate, we encounter a number of references to

---

61 Ibid., 24, ll. 14-15: “intellectus vero ipsi nihil aliud nisi rerum significativi sunt”.
63 Suto (2011, 111).
64 John of Damascus (1958, 201); cf. Panaccio (1999, 80). The reader should note that Aristotle had already distinguished between an esō logos and an exō logos, for which see Aquinas (1992, 10).
65 Aquinas (1980b, 74), In I Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 1 co.; ST, I, q. 34, a. 1.
what he terms verbum cordis or verbum in corde, using a combined visual and verbal model for thought. We should note, in passing, that it is the visual model which predominates in Ramon Llull’s vast LC, given that he classes cogitation, a spiritual or intellectual “sense”, as “spiritual sight”. The term verbum generally has three senses for Augustine: first, as that which, by its syllables, occupies a temporal period, whether it is spoken or thought; second, that which is known and is imprinted on the mind, insofar as it can be brought forth and defined using one’s memory, even if its reality is displeasing to us; and, third, what amounts to verbum cordis proper, that which, when conceived by the mind, is pleasing to us. However, the distinction for which he is best known in this respect is that between verbum cordis itself, which belongs to no given language (and corresponds to the image present within one’s memory insofar as it is thought in act); verbum imaginabile or imaginatio vocis, namely, the mental representation of the spoken word (for example, prayers uttered in silence in a given language); and the spoken word itself, a model to which Aquinas closely adheres, at least in his Quaestiones disputatae de veritate. Notably, it should be remarked that the verbum cordis and the imaginatio vocis are distinct in both Augustine and Aquinas, the former representing in the latter author both the terminus of intellection and the starting point of verbal discourse. In passing, it should also be mentioned that it was only in the 1220s that William of Auvergne reconciled the disparate tripartite models of verbum and oratio espoused respectively by Augustine and Boethius.

We should also recall, however, that, in his De doctrina christiana, written three years before the De trinitate, Augustine defines a sign as “a thing which

---

67 ORL IV, 412: “vista espiritual”.
68 Augustine (1997a, 100-102), De trinitate, IX, 10, 15; and PL 42: 968-969: “Recte ergo quaeritur, utrum omnis notitia verbum, an tantum amata notitia. Novimus enim et ea quae odimus; sed nec concepta, nec parta dicenda sunt animo, quae nobis displicent [...] Verbum est igitur, quod nunc discernere et insinuare volumus, cum amore notitia. Cum itaque se mens novit et amat, jungitur ei amore verbum ejus. Et quoniam amat notitiam et novit amorem, et verbum in amore est, et amor in verbo, et utrumque in amante atque dicente.”
69 Augustine (1997a, 468), De trinitate, XV, 10, 19; and PL 42: 1071: “Necesse est enim cum verum loquimur, id est, quod scimus loquimur, ex ipsa scientia quam memoria tenemus, nascatur verbum quod ejusmodi sit omnino, cujusmodi est illa scientia de qua nascitur. Formata quippe cogitatio ab ea re quam scimus, verbum est quod in corde dicimus: quod nec graecum est, nec latinum, nec linguae alcujuus alterius”; Augustine (1997a, 490), XV, 14, 24: “Verbum autem nostrum illud illud quod non habet sonum neque cogitationem soni, sed ejus rei quam videndo intus dicimus, et ideo nullius linguae est.”
70 Cf. above, n. 28.
71 Aquinas (1992, 10).
72 Panaccio (1999), 161.
of itself makes some other thing come to mind, besides the impression that it presents to the senses”. And he goes on to define given (or conventional) signs as being “those which living things give to each other, in order to show, to the best of their ability, the emotions of their minds, or anything that they have felt or learnt”. Unlike Boethius, for whom words signify (primarily) thoughts or concepts and only mediate things, Augustine believes that it is the things themselves that are signified by signs. Likewise, the Boethian view, according to which the concept itself was significative, was antithetical to the Augustinian belief that signs act upon the senses. It should be noted, however, that Boethius can be seen to have also entertained a one-stage semantic theory wherein spoken words immediately signify the thoughts conceptualising things.

Llull’s interest in St Augustine’s words on the “word” (or even those of John of Damascus), however, would not have been purely theoretical or related exclusively to matters concerning “internal discourse”, given the ensuing and powerful parallels Augustine makes between the Word of God as “spoken” inwardly in the Trinity and His Word as “spoken” outwardly and by which it was made flesh. Llull’s own Trinitarian and, in particular, Incarnational theology, therefore, bear close relations in his earlier works, at least, to his thinking about human “internal” and “external discourse”. Any changes in Llull’s thought about “internal discourse”, not to mention its external counterpart can, therefore, be correlated with and calibrated against any shifts of focus identified in his Christology.

The second writer of significance to Ramon Llull is St Anselm, in Chapters 10 and 11 of whose *Monologion* a tripartite scheme similar to that of Augustine is given, though here distinguishing between, first, internal speech without the use of any signs, though availing oneself of either corporeal images or rational

73 Augustine (1962, 32), *De doctrina christiana*, II, 1, 1: “Signum est enim res praeter speciem, quam ingerit sensibus, alius aliud ex se faciens in cogitationem venire”; English translation from Augustine (1997b, 30).


75 Cf. Read (2015, 16).

76 Augustine (1962, 33-34), *De doctrina christiana*, II, 3, 4: “Signorum igitur, quibus inter se homines sua sensa communicant, quaedam pertinent ad ocularum sensum, pleraque ad aurium, paucissima ad ceteros sensus”.

77 Suto (2011, 33-34).

understanding, the former through the imagination of a sensible thing’s appearance, the latter through definition of that thing’s universal essence; second, internal speech by means of the same signs, though thinking them imperceptibly; and, third, speech by means of perceptible signs.\textsuperscript{79} A distinction, however, should be noted between Anselm and Augustine, insofar as the former uses the term \textit{locutio mentis}, albeit rarely, to describe this first kind of speech, internal, intuitive and definitional, based upon likenesses and “the same for all”, as it is, a term which exceeds the scope of Augustine’s \textit{verbum cordis}.\textsuperscript{80}

For Anselm, both the terms \textit{verbum} and \textit{locutio mentis} indicate the contemplation and rational expression of a likeness.\textsuperscript{81} A further term he introduces, again albeit rarely, however, namely, \textit{conceptio mentis}, adds to this the possibility of creative composition on the basis of this very likeness, and thus can itself be likened to bodily conception.\textsuperscript{82} I believe that, under Boethian influence, Anselm’s contribution to Llull’s thought, above and beyond that of St Augustine, is crucial for understanding Llull’s own move from a theory of internal speech which is initially conceived pre-linguistically to one which, at least, makes greater allowance for linguistic components within “internal discourse”, even if such components belong to no particular language, as well as for understanding Llull’s introduction of definitions into his Art.\textsuperscript{83}

I say this because, for Anselm, mental speech, being pre-linguistic and internal, constitutes not only contemplation of a thing’s likeness, but also its definition. Furthermore, Anselm confers a linguistic dimension upon “internal discourse” through his contention that definition can be as representative of a thing’s reality as can its image. I would suggest that it was between the years 1283, at the earliest, and 1289 that Llull either deepened his familiarity with or began to conceive applications for Boethian and Anselmian thinking on this matter.

\textsuperscript{79} Anselm (1853, 0158 B-C): “Frequenti namque usu cognoscitur quia rem unam tripliciter loqui possumus. Aut enim res loquimur signis sensibilibus, id est, quae sensibus corporeis sentiri possunt, sensibiliter utendo; aut eadem signa, quae foris sensibilia sunt, intra nos insensibiliter cogitando; aut nec sensibiliter, nec insensibiliter his signis utendo, sed res ipsas, vel corporum imaginacione, vel rationis intellectu, pro rerum ipsarum diversitate, intus in nostra mente dicendo”; for English translation, cf. Anselm (2007, 18). I have reversed the order here for ease of comparison with Augustine’s own tripartite scheme.

\textsuperscript{80} Hurand (2009, 30-31).

\textsuperscript{81} Hurand (2009, 42).

\textsuperscript{82} Id.

\textsuperscript{83} It is worth speculating that among the multiple reasons behind Llull’s major reformulation of his Art in 1290 may have been an increasing awareness on his part of the logical and semantic contributions of writers such as William of Sherwood and Peter of Spain, under the influence of which he may have taken something of a “linguistic turn”.
As Claude Panaccio has observed, it was Albert the Great who, in his *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, reconciled the various authorities on “internal discourse”, forcing an Anselmian interpretation upon the tripartite schema of John of Damascus, whereby the latter’s *logos endiathetos* or “internal discourse” comes to be associated with the Augustinian tradition’s *verbum imaginationis* and his “natural movement of the mind”, which he considered to be the pure light of reason, with, again, the Augustinian tradition’s *verbum cordis*. Interestingly, from a Christological point of view, Albert also equates the eternal Word, as regards its eternal procession, with the Augustinian *verbum cordis*, namely, pre-linguistic internal discourse, while likening the Word made flesh to the scholastic *verbum vocis* or external utterance, for the reason that just as the latter contains more than the thing uttered (*res dicta*), so too does the Son of God contain more than the Father once He has assumed flesh, by which flesh He is revealed to us.

We should also note that in his *De sacramentis Christianae fidei*, II, 18, 19, Hugh of St Victor reiterates verbatim Augustine’s dictum from *De trinitate*, to the effect that “the word that sounds outwardly is the sign of the word that gives light inwardly”. Earlier in the same work, I, 3, 20, “De verbo intrinseco et extrinseco”, Hugh insists on the parallel distinction between internal and external discourse in man and God, the former being equated in both man and God to wisdom, the latter, in God at least to His works, and in man, to outward speech, both of which latter make manifest that which formerly was invisible and hidden. Within this text, Hugh also makes a strict equation between *cogitatio* and the Augustinian *verbum cordis* or “speech of the heart”, stating:

[...] just as man’s thought (*cogitatio*) constitutes his internal speech, which lies hidden and out of view until it is revealed through utterance in speech; and this utterance is the speech of the voice in the same way that thought (*cogitatio*) is the speech of the heart.

---

84 Albert the Great (1893, 46-47).
85 Ibid., 47: “Verbum aeternum [...] potest considerari [...] secundum processionem aeternam, et sic maxime convenit cum verbo cordis [...] Verbum autem in carne, hoc est verbum habens similitudinem cum verbo vocis: quia sicut illud habet plus quam res dicta, ita Filius plus quam Pater de carne assumpta, in qua manifestatus est nobis.”
87 Hugh of St Victor (1854, 225A-B).
88 Id.: “[...] quemadmodum cogitatio hominis quasi intrinsecum verbum illius est quod latet et ab-
That Llull, in fact, observed the commonplace thirteenth-century distinction between thought, speech and writing (deriving from Boethius’s triple sense of oratio) can be seen in Chapter 155 of LC, though at a stage in Llull’s development prior to his being able to have had direct access to Boethius’s works themselves. In this chapter, Llull makes a number of familiar distinctions, the overarching one being bipartite, namely, the distinction between speech and understanding (or thought), the former of which he aligns with the realm of the senses, the latter with that of the intellect, which latter enjoys greater nobility. He defines speech in functional terms as being created in man for the purpose of revealing and signifying the latter’s understanding (or thought), speech again being subordinate to thought, harbouring ambiguity and lability, and generally proving insufficient to the task of contemplating God’s Virtues, at the very least. Sections 19-21 of this chapter are the most pertinent ones in terms of the theory of language.

Therein Llull, while asserting the limits of both speech and human understanding, nevertheless claims that the understanding, being intellectual, is capable of perceiving truth, and is only hindered from so doing by the corrupting influence of sin on the senses. Such provides the broader epistemological and moral framework within which he shows an overall familiarity with the distinctions between words, thoughts and things found in the Boethian “semantic triangle”, as well as between spoken words and their written equivalent, not to mention the role of the reader in uncovering the meaning of words. The theoretical components regarding language, however, are subordinated by Llull to his tropological concerns here, namely, those exemplified by the superiority of “spiritual” over a “literal” reading, a distinction which duplicates that of “intellectual” and “sensible”.

The same tripartite distinction as that used by Boethius can, however, be found in Chapter 104, § 12 of the Romanç d’Èvast e Blaquerna (hereafter Blaquerna) in the context of comments regarding the optimal manner of contemplation, again with allusions to both reading and the distinction between the three types of speech: internal, spoken and written. At this stage, Llull could conceivably have come into contact with Boethius’s writings. I quote at some length:

sconditum est donec reveletur per prolationem oris; et est ipsa prolatio vocis verbum similiter ut verbum est cogitatio cordis”.

89 ORL IV, 328-329.
90 Ibid., 333.
So, when he had completed his prayer, he wrote down what he had contemplated, and then read what he had written down; yet he did not feel as much devotion while he was reading it as he had while he was contemplating the same. Contemplation, therefore, is not so devout when one is reading a book as it is when one is actually contemplating the arguments written down in that book. The reason for this is that, during contemplation, the soul rises higher in order to remember, understand and love the Divine Essence than it does when it reads about what it has already contemplated, for devotion better befits contemplation than it does the written word.\(^91\)

Interesting here is the manner in which Llull frames this tripartite schema within the Christian devotional practices of contemplation or prayer. Prayer, of course, could be either liturgical and outwardly spoken or uttered internally in silence, assessing each component of that schema as regards its active contribution to such practices. Of interest also, not least in terms of the medieval logical and semantic theories to which it aligns Llull’s above statements, is the fact that some years later, in his *Summa logicae* (ca. 1323), in the context of a discussion of “natural signification”, William of Ockham discussed the distinctions, similar to the above, between written, spoken and mental language, reaching much the same conclusions as to their hierarchy, though for different reasons, while alluding also to the Aristotelian notion of *passiones animae*, which, we recall, are “the same for all”:

Now certain differences are found among these [kinds of] terms. One is that a concept or passion of the soul signifies naturally whatever it signifies. But a spoken or written term signifies nothing except according to arbitrary institution. From this there follows another difference, namely that a spoken or written term can change its signification by convention, but a conceived term does not change its signification according to any convention whatsoever.\(^92\)

\(^{91}\) NEORL VIII, 537: “E quan hac finida sa oració, escriví ço de què havia contemplat e pus llegí ço que escrit havia, e no hac tanta de devoció dementre que ho llegia com havia dementre que ho contemplava. E per açò la contemplació no és tan devota en lligent lo llibre com és en contemplar les raons escrites en lo llibre; e açò és per ço car en la contemplació l’ànima puja pus alt a membrar, entendre, amar la divina essència que no fa quan llig ço que contemplava, car devoció mills se convé a contemplació que a escriptura”; cf. Llull (2016, 503-504), English version.

\(^{92}\) William Ockham (1951, II. 46-52), *Summa logicae*, I, 1, § 10: “Inter istos autem terminos aliaque differentiae reperiuntur. Una est, quod conceptus sive passio animae naturaliter significat quidquid signifacit, terminus autem prolatus vel scriptus nihil significat nisi secundum voluntariam institutionem. Ex quo sequitur alia differentia, videlicet, quod terminus prolatus vel scriptus ad placitum potest mutare suum significatum, terminus autem conceptus non mutat suum significatum ad placitum cuiuscumque”; English translation (here slightly modified) from Spade (2007, 94).
As Vincent Spade comments, “[the above] tells us, then, in what sense the terms of mental language are supposed to be the same for everyone”.\textsuperscript{93}

To align Ramon Llull, however, with the later doctrine of \textit{oratio mentalis} espoused by William of Ockham (and associated with an intuitionist theory of knowledge) might seem to run the risk of both philosophical and historiographical incoherence, given not least that Llull is generally considered to hold a realist (or “superrealist”) position and Ockham something resembling a nominalist one with regard to the metaphysical problem of universals, a considerable distance separating the two of them across the available spectrum of possibilities. Mark D. Johnston has argued that Llull is just such a realist, stating that Llull’s

superrealist metaphysics, [if] applied globally to things, concepts and words, [...] is in fact a universal allegory, a kind of metaphysics of meaning. Insofar as Llull assumes that this meaning necessarily exists in reality prior to existing in thought or in language, he never doubts that the world is always speaking even if no human ears or hearts are listening.\textsuperscript{94}

Johnston’s statement can remain true even if we accept (as I shall go on to suggest) that Llull adopts a Boethian position whereby causal priority is assigned to thought over spoken speech, for the reason that though the real may retain its metaphysical primacy, mankind aspires to and angels accomplish the greatest approximation thereto in thought itself, that is to say, internal discourse. The Lullian project wherein the \textit{ordo essendi} and the \textit{ordo cognoscendi} meet and coincide is also reflected, I believe, at the level of a desire on Llull’s part to attain the greatest possible reconciliation between the real and the intellectual or conceptual. Things, concepts and words (or reality, thought and language), for Llull, can not only correspond but also coincide to the extent that they, being part of the same created theophanic whole, resemble the Exemplar, namely God, and His exemplary and co-essential Ideas, namely the divine Dignities, the aseity of this exemplar-God being iterated in thought (as self-love), in language or divine internal utterance (as filiation) and in reality (as the incarnated Christ annunciacted by the Holy Spirit). Thus ontology, epistemology, metaphysics, theology and medieval theories of language and mind fully overlap.

It is worth noting, however, with regard to the above quoted passage from

\textsuperscript{93} Id.
\textsuperscript{94} Johnston (1996, 34).
Blaquerna that, in the LC, Llull even categorises reading as a “sensible” form of prayer. And again, in Blaquerna, Chapter 108, § 11, Llull concludes his prayer and contemplation with the words (and I quote): “In this way, and much better than can be either spoken or written, did Blaquerna contemplate God’s Virtues within his soul by means of the Pater noster”.

In contrast to the above, however, by 1290, the date at which Llull composed his Oracions de Ramon, a work designed to satisfy the desire of many people, and I translate, “to know how to acquire a method whereby they may learn to pray to God unstintingly and to love Him with a very lofty and great love”, he devotes the entire final part of the work to recommending (here, XIII, 37, § 2) that his reader go back over the preceding twelve parts, paragraph by paragraph, “so that, when one has fervently read the paragraph, let one ponder in one’s mind what one has read: one will then find sweetness and love in such pondering; and let the speech of one’s mind flourish, by considering, worshipping and contemplating God’s Trinity”.

The fact that Augustine’s verbal model of thought supposed a radical division between verbum and that by which it is externalised, may have seemed to represent a major disadvantage to Llull, not only in terms of the theorisation of internal and external discourse, namely, of how one manifests one’s thoughts to another, but also of the practice of such manifestation to others, others who may carry misconceptions regarding the beliefs, if it is beliefs, that one is trying to convey. It is for this reason that Llull has recourse to the speech of angels, precisely as a model for human “internal discourse”. Indeed, In Distinction IV, Chapter 3, § 1 of his Llibre dels àngels, Llull asserts that human internal discourse specifically consists in the soul’s communication with the internal discourse of angels. In appealing to this model, Llull sets out from the traditional basis of an analogy between angelic and human mental speech, stating in Distinction IV, Chapter 1, of the same work, that:

---

95 ORL VIII, 3.
96 NEORL VIII, 552: “Enaxí, e molt mills que no·s pot recomptar ni scriure, contemplava Blaquerna en sa anima les virtuts de Deu ab lo Pater noster”; Llull (2016, 518), English version.
97 ORL XVIII, 315: “aver manera per la qual sapien molt de pregar Deus e amar de molt alta e gran amor”.
98 ORL XVIII, 380: “On, con hom aurà legit ferventment lo palagrafi, retorn hom en sa pensa so que aurà legit: adonchs atrobarà dousor e amor en aquell retornament; e montiplich les paraules de sa pensa, consirant la Trinitat de Deu, adorant e contemplant”.
99 ORL XXI, 360-361: “enaxí con unes paraules sensuals se parlen ab altres paraules sensuals, enaxí les mentals paraules de l anima se parlen ab les del àngel”.

Just as people make mental use of the acts of the powers of their soul, their memory remembering and their intellect understanding and their will loving the objects they receive, so too does an angel speak to itself when it remembers, understands and loves itself distinctly [...].

Llull goes on to give a more comprehensive definition of angelic speech later in the same section, stating that it consists in the “ordered disposition” found in the fact that an angel, by its own particular nature:

understands, loves and concords with that which it behoves justice to bring into accord as regards memory intellect and will by means of goodness, greatness, power, wisdom, love and perfection.

The text of this work shows, however, that it is precisely in the opposite direction that the analogy should be made or, in fact, is recommended. Llull, in this work, is enjoining humanity to conduct its “internal discourse” by means solely of its intellectual powers, as must angels, to the exclusion of the imagination and the bodily senses.

In summary, then, and in the simplest terms, by the mid-thirteenth century there was both a powerful Aristotelian-Boethian strand and a powerful Augustinian-Anselmian strand of thought as regards “internal discourse”, and the prevalent tendency was to reconcile Aristotle with Augustine, by integrating the former’s thought into the framework of that of the latter. In this context, it might be possible to judge the tenor of Llull’s thought in this respect, at least within the period 1278-1290, by assessing whether his use of the term similitudo or likeness owed more to the Boethian than to the Anselmian use of this term, and to establish thereby the time of his acquaintance with both of these writers during these years.

---

100 ORL XXI, 354: “Enaxí con en home mentalment usen de lurs actus les potencies de la ànima, membrant memòria e entenent enteniment e amant la volentat los objects que prenen, enaxí angel parla ab si mateix con se remembra e s entén e s ama distinctament.”

101 ORL XXI, 355: “entén e ama e concorda ço que justícia cové convenir de memòria, enteniment e volentat per bonea, graneea, poder, saviea, amor e perfecció”.

2.1. Thought, prayer and truth, and the precedence of mental over vocal speech

One would think that any discussion of "internal discourse" or "mental speech" should first consider speech in general, or rather, external speech. As we shall see, however, Ramon Llull and the previously mentioned Boethian tradition consider thought, that is to say, "mental speech", to have both causal and natural priority over vocal sounds or "spoken speech".

It is a well-known fact that Aristotle’s *De interpretatione*, in fact, concentrated on only one of the five classical divisions of *oratio* (or speech), namely, *oratio enuntiativa*, that is to say, the declarative (or indicative) sentence, which bears either truth or falsity.\(^{103}\) Interestingly, in this work, Aristotle states that:

> Every sentence is significant […] by convention […], but not every sentence is a [declarative] sentence, but only those in which there is truth or falsity. There is not truth or falsity in all sentences: a prayer is a sentence but is neither true [n]or false.\(^{104}\)

---

\(^{103}\) Cf. Stock (1983, 368). Though Stock does not mention them, the five divisions or classes of statement are variously defined by Boethius in his First and Second Commentaries on the *Peri hermeneias* as including the following: deprecative, interrogative, imperative, vocative and indicative; the First Commentary drops the reference to interrogative statements, but instead makes a distinction between optative and deprecatory statements; for the foregoing, cf. Grande Alija (1996, 24 and n. 20); cf. also Boethius (1987a, 70-71; 1987b, 95ff.). Cf. also Aquinas (1980c, 327), Pro., 3, in which the author states that "ideo sola oratio enunciativa, in qua verum vel falsum inventur, interpretatio vocatur, ceterae vero orationes, ut optativa et imperativa, magis ordinantur ad exprimendum affectum, quam ad interpretandum id quod in intellectu habetur". Note that William of Sherwood’s division differs slightly from the Boethian ones, cf. Latin: William of Sherwood (1983, 224); English: William of Sherwood (1966, 25).

\(^{104}\) Aristotle (1995b, 26), J. L. Ackrill (tr.), here slightly amended, *De interpretatione*, 4, 17a1-4: "Est autem oratio omnis quidem significativa […] secundum placitum; enuntiativa vero non omnis, sed in qua verum vel falsum inest; non autem in omnibus, ut deprecatio oratio quidem est, sed neque vera neque falsa", "Translatio boethii", in Aristoteles latinus (1965, 8; emphasis added); "Est autem oratio omnis quidem significativa […] secundum confessionem; enuntiativa autem non omnis, sed in quae verum aut falsum contingat dicere; non in omnibus autem existit; puta optatio oratio quidem, sed neque vera neque falsa", "Translatio guillelmi de moerbeka (Recensio ammoniana)", ibid., 43 (emphasis added). Note the different divisions of *oratio* to which Boethius and William, respectively, assign prayer, for which see previous note. Aristotle had already commented in the opening chapter of this work that “a sign […] signifies something but not, as yet, anything true or false—unless ‘is’ or ‘is not’ is added (either simply or with reference to time)”, ibid., 25; again, J. L. Ackrill (tr.), *De interpretatione*, 16a16-18: “signum […] significat aliquid, sed nondum verum vel falsum, si non vel ‘esse’ vel ‘non esse’ addatur vel simpliciter vel secundum tempus”, “Translatio boethii”, in Aristoteles latinus (1965, 6); William of Moerbeke’s translation shows little variation from the foregoing. Taken together, these two passages would seem to suggest a strangely circular argument in Aristotle’s reasoning, namely: a) the truth (or falsity) of a sign depends on its forming part of a declarative sentence; b) the truth (or falsity) of a sentence depends on its being declarative; and c) being a declarative sentence itself depends on the presence of a criterion of truth and falsity. Aristotle thus defines truth in propositional terms and propositions in terms of their capacity to bear truth (or falsity). I would argue that Llull himself attributes truth value to sentences other than those which are declarative,
It is clear from Llull’s writings on prayer that he disagreed with the stance Aristotle took on this matter. As we can see from a mature work by Llull, the Oracions de Ramon, composed in Barcelona in 1290 and presented to James II of Aragon as a gift for his wife Blanche of Anjou, Llull certainly believed that prayer could be addressed to truth (he apostrophises God as ‘one God, one Lord, one Creator, one Truth’), be concerned with truth and error as regards religious beliefs and be aimed at re-establishing humanity as a whole upon the “path of truth”. My sense, in reading this short work, is that Llull is suggesting that if prayer is a form of thought, which, in his view, it is (“praying to God in your thought”), and, as we shall see, thoughts in combination can bear truth-values, as can words in combination, then prayers themselves consisting of, in Llull’s words, “the speech of [one’s] thought” can possess truth-value. Given that prayers do not typically consist solely of declarative sentences, Lullian prayer would either have to do so or extend the realm of truth beyond the indicative mood.

Another quite simple reason as to why prayers can possess truth-value, for Llull, is found in Dist. XL, ch. 315 of his considerably earlier LC. Here we see that the third form or “figure” of prayer he enumerates, that is to say, prayer which consists of good deeds and the practice of the virtues, a figure combining the two less elevated forms thereof, namely, sensible and intellectual prayer, can possess truth-value precisely insofar as it resembles and participates in the divine Virtues themselves, among which “truth” is a conspicuous presence. He specifies, moreover, that the veracity of one’s prayers, or more particularly of the “figures” wherein and whereby they are articulated, is guaranteed solely by the correct ordering of one’s sensible and intellectual faculties, stating in a significant metaphor that “[j]ust as a true mirror signifies truly the figures [or forms] represented therein, so too are these three figures of prayer truly represented by the ordering that is carried out within these three figures”. As we

even to signs alone, possibly as a result of Neoplatonic influences, whereby individual signs, not to mention things and thoughts, can enjoy the equation between goodness, beauty and truth.

105 ORL XVIII, 349: “.j. deu, .j. senyor, un creador, una veritat”.
106 Id.: “via de veritat”.
107 Ibid., 389: “pregant Deu en ta pensa”.
108 Ibid., 380: “les paraules de sa pensa”.
109 Note that William G. Lycan proposes that non-indicative sentences in general (including imperatives, questions and requests) can possess truth-value, in Lycan (2008, 118); for further discussion of this claim, cf. also Daly (2013, 93-94).
110 ORL VIII, 5-6.
111 Ibid., 6: “Enaxí com lo mirall vertader significa vertaderament les figures que a ell se representen,
see later in this same chapter, Llull also believed that, in a non-trivial sense, there could be such things as false and true (sensible or intellectual) prayer, a false figure in the case of false intellectual prayer consisting of false intention, false remembering, false understanding and false willing, the falsity in each case here being equated to belief in a false religion.

In Chapter 155, §§ 1, 3 and 4 of LC, a chapter which employs the spiritual sense of “cogitation” to delineate the concordances and contrarieties existing between the human understanding and speech, Llull clearly asserts the superiority of the former over the latter on a number of grounds, namely: that the former is intellectual, the latter sensible; that speech plays a subordinate role in revealing and signifying human understanding; and that the understanding is internal and thus closer to the soul than is speech, which is external. What’s more, in comments addressing the relative truth-values attaching to thoughts and speech, he states that the understanding (i.e. the locus of thinking) has greater capacity than does speech to demonstrate the truth, again on the grounds of the former’s closer union with the soul. And he goes on to say that the very fact that the understanding can always understand more truth than speech can convey is the source of the discord and contrast that can arise between understanding and speech, a point having as much relevance to his contemplative as it does to his apologetic project.

In the latter respect, it is important to observe that Llull attributes the misapprehensions that, in his view, unbelievers entertain as regards the Christian Articles of Faith, to human communication or speech rather than to the unbelievers themselves. In the same chapter, Llull even specifies the need for a “mean” or “middle” between the extremes of conflicting speech and intellect. Effectively, what Llull recommends to occupy this position is that affirmations regarding an intellectual understanding of a matter should take precedence over what is signified in speech, when the latter is contrary to the former. He goes on to attribute ambiguity solely to speech and not to inte-

enaxi aquestes .iij. figures d oracio son afigurades vertaderament per l'ordonament qui es fet en les .iij. figures.”

112 Ibid., 7-8.
113 Ibid., 8.
114 Ibid., 9.
115 ORL IV, 328-329.
116 ORL IV, 329.
117 Ibid., 331-332.
lectual understanding, and to assert the concordance of speech and understanding in syllogisms and the contrariety of the two former in paralogisms, the former occurring when the senses are subordinate to the intellect and the latter, when not.

We should note in respect of truth-value, mentioned above, that in Boethius’s reading of Aristotle, truth and falsity in a proposition are dependent upon the existence of combination (or composition) and division therein, in the case of thoughts as of words. Hence, for Boethius, even thoughts admit of compositionality. Thoughts or words not subject to composition or division, namely, in the case of words, single nouns or verbs, cannot possess truth-value, though they may signify thoughts conceptualising things. Even as early as LC, where, in Chapter 328, Ramon Llull introduces the quasi-algebraic notation of concepts and initiates their combinatorial interactions, these concepts later in his Arts being dominated by the divine attributes or “Dignities”, we can see that such concepts, and subsequently the “Dignities” themselves, rely at least in part upon the principle of compositionality for their truth-value.

We should also note at this point, that Llull’s incorporation of the principle of “Doubt”, alongside “Affirmation” and “Negation”, within the “Black Triangle” of Figure T from the time of his Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem, composed circa 1274, may well have been influenced by Augustine’s deliberations thereon in his De trinitate, XV, to the effect that both doubt and lies can be considered “internal discourse”, because in one’s heart one is still saying that which one knows.

I would also suggest that, while in Montpellier during the period 1278-1283, Llull would have acquainted himself with material that might have confirmed any earlier sense he had that thought itself, that is to say, “internal discourse” was the true means or medium of communication and thus held a more privileged position than “external discourse” itself. We should note in

---

118 Ibid., 332.
119 Ibid., 333.
120 ORL VIII, 155-168.
121 Augustine (1997a, 492), De trinitate, XV, 15, 24; and PL 42: 1077-1078, here 1077: “Falsum est ergo isto modo verbum nostrum, non cum mentimur, sed cum fallimur. Cum autem dubitamus, nondum est verbum de re de qua dubitamus, sed de ipsa dubitatione verbum est. Quamvis enim non noverimus an verum sit unde dubitamus, tamen dubitare nos novimus: ac per hoc cum hoc dicimus, verum verbum est; quoniam quod novimus dicimus. Quid, quod etiam mentiri possimus? Quod cum facimus, utique volentes et scientes falsum verbum habemus: ubi verum verbum est mentiri nos; hoc enim scimus. Et cum mentitos nos esse confitemur, verum dicimus: quod scimus enim dicimus; scimus namque nos esse mentitos.”
passing here, however, that while Aristotle distinguished between an organ (or instrument), a medium and an object of communication, Llull made a distinction between the organ, the instrument and the object thereof, the former two possibly coinciding, though differing in essence. Llull may well have omitted the term medium in his classification precisely because he conceived of thought itself as that very medium.

Interestingly enough, in the context of a discussion of angelic speech—and I have suggested earlier that Llull himself conceives of angelic speech as the model for human “internal discourse”—St Thomas Aquinas asserts in a number of works that such speech does not require a medium, insofar as the sign is not the means whereby the concept is rendered external in angels, but rather the concept itself constitutes the sign in respect of its ordinatio ad alterum or intentionality, while for man the concept constitutes the signified of external speech (In II Sent., dist. 11, q. 2, a. 3 ad 3). And whereas earlier in Thomas’s works, verbum cordis had been associated with the pre-linguistic formation of the internal verbum, in In II Sent., dist. 11, q. 2, a. 3 co., he equates the former in angels with ordinatio ad alterum.

2.2. Ramon Llull: The “semantic triangle” and demonstration

Llull’s prioritisation of the psychological/cognitive, in his early works, at least, has its roots in his desire to resolve the ambiguity of man’s nature as both a corporeal and a spiritual being in the direction of the subordination of man’s sensory apparatus and thus of external speech itself, via arguments pointing to their insufficiency; the prioritisation of the intellectual powers; and the proposal that a pre-linguistic and superlatively intellectual mode of communication is possible without recourse to speech. By such prioritisation and subordination, Llull invokes his doctrine of intentions and reveals contemplation of the divine attributes and of the activity of these both within

123 Aquinas (1980b, 156): “Unde non exigitur aliquod medium per quod deferatur locutio unius ad alterum; sed sufficit ad hoc solus ordo intentionis unius ad manifestandum alteri”; Aquinas (1980d, 61), De veritate, q. 9, a. 6 ad 4: “Unde non oportet ponere aliquod medium per quod deferatur aliquid ab uno in alterum”. Cf. Rosier-Catach (2009, 81).
124 Aquinas (1980b, 156): “Quando ergo speciem conceptam ordinat ut manifestandum alteri, dicitur verbum cordis”. Cf. Rosier-Catach (2009, 79). Rosier-Catach, in fact, misidentifies this passage as being found in In I Sent., dist. 11, q. 2, a. 3 co.
125 Cf. Mark D. Johnston regarding Lull’s prioritisation of the psychological/cognitive aspects of speech as a sense over those of communication between individuals per se, in Johnston (1990a, 22).
the Godhead and in creation as the driving force behind the construction of the elaborate demonstrative mechanism that was his Art.

Josep Enric Rubio has drawn my attention to an important passage in the prologue to the *AIV* (1290), a work which marks a turning-point in Llull’s career insofar as it both initiates the Ternary Phase proper and reduces the Figures to four, while also renouncing the use of letters from the Alphabet within the text (though nevertheless employing them within the Figures). The passage in question states:

> Yet since the existence and activity of the things upon which we are focusing are more forceful and numerous in themselves than are the likenesses thereof in the intellect, and these likenesses more powerful and abundant in the intellect than are the significations thereof in words, there is a great distance, therefore, between such significations and the things to which they pertain. Out of necessity, therefore, we must invent words, both on account of the scarcity of significations and for the sake of the power and exigencies of the Art, and must occasionally utter unusual words, as will be made clear below.

Here, by pointing to the existence of an inverted pyramidal hierarchy descending from things (or, more precisely, the existence and activity of things) via likenesses in the mind to the significations of words, Llull succinctly provides a rationale for his use of *inusitata verba*, specifically, as he goes on to show, the terminology relating to his correlative theory. In doing so, Llull is testifying to his belief in the insufficiency of language, that is to say, both in terms of the numerical insufficiency of its units (*propter significatorum paucitatem*) in relation to the things and likenesses lying above them (*plures*, *ampliores*) and in terms of the insufficiency of its capacities, in this case, significatory capacities, in relation to the power (*vehementiores, maiores*) that resides in, once again, the things and likenesses lying above them.

---


127 Ibid., 7-8: “Et quoniam ita est quod existentiae et operationes rerum, de quibus intenditur, vehementiores atque plures sunt in se ipsis quam earum similitudines in intellectu, et ipsae similitudines maiores et ampliores quam in sermonibus earum significata, magna est ergo distantia significatorum a rebus suis. Ea propter de necessitate nos oportet fingere uerba, licet propter significatorum paucitatem et de ui et de necessitate artis aliquotiens inusitata uerba profferre, uelut infra patebit”; cf. *MOG* V, i, 1-2 (1-2). For a different account of this passage than the one I go on to give, cf. also Rubio (2017a, 38-40). I should like to thank Josep Enric Rubio for drawing this passage to my attention.
In this instance, it seems Llull is trying to transcend language, while remaining notionally, at least, within language, by extending and supplementing language through the coinage of neologisms (fingere, inusitata verba proferre) precisely on account of the numerical insufficiency of words (propter significatorum paucitatem). It is only if we take the term paucitas, however, to condense within a single term the contrary of both of the non-synonymous terms within the pairings vehementiores (MOG: majores) et plures, in the first case, and majores et ampliores, in the second, pairings which themselves are nevertheless synonymous with each other, though show variation for rhetorical reasons, that one could construe Llull as also claiming that language lacked significatory power (as well as numerical sufficiency).

However, if one does so, one has to admit the synthetic and polysemic nature of a single term, a fact which would itself suggest very strongly that language, as shown by a single term, itself indicating scarcity and lack, actually points to the very capacity which, by reason of paucitas itself, it is claimed that language, in fact, fails to possess. What Llull seems to be doing here, therefore, is not to bypass likenesses or concepts, themselves the content of “internal discourse”, in order to achieve greater correspondence between terms and their referents, but rather to harness the richness of those very likenesses which, mercifully, are fewer in number than the essences and activities of external reality. All the foregoing is done in order to reinforce and meet the requirements of the Art (de ui et de necessitate artis), the Art here seeming to be the weakest element of all, situated at the inverted apex of the pyramid.

To continue this excursus, we should not forget here that Llull’s Art, from its very outset, sought to be compendious and, for pragmatic reasons, became increasingly so over time. The principle in operation here is, therefore, one of conceptual parsimony within which one seeks to reduce to a manageable number the set of concepts and principles by which one interprets reality. External reality only enjoys a certain primacy as “the real” by virtue of being the occasion of certain types of mental act and mental content; the human mind, however, though not conceived as such, is governed by the three Augustinian powers of the human intellective soul, and however connected this may be to man’s sensible soul, that intellective soul is ontologically superior to both external reality (bar God Himself and angels, in certain respects) and any sensible component or ideation of the human being conjoined to it.

The multiplicity and seeming ontological plenitude of external reality represent a challenge to the human being on the very levels of its multiplicity
and plenitude. A person’s struggle to comprehend, to respond morally and ethically to, and to divide up materially and conceptually that reality, as well as that person’s struggle to express in words the thoughts he or she has concerning that reality are functions of that person’s human nature and the position it finds itself in within the world. However, the desire to perfect all these things is equally human, in Llull’s view. Hence, Llull’s reluctance potentially to increase the number of words unnecessarily, an enterprise he ultimately justifies on the grounds that such increase, such multiplication, is, in fact, de ui et de necessitate artis, as if no other motive would be sufficient.

To assert that Llull was averse to multiplication in his Art tout court, would be a strange claim to make, given the 1,680 (potentially syllogistic) reasons generated in the “Table” of his Ars generalis ultima (1305-1308; hereafter AGU) as a result of the “Multiplication of the Fourth Figure”. However, Llull is averse to unprofitable and promiscuous multiplication at an ontological level, at the very least, and endorses a form of what I would call “ontic parsimony” found only in the figure and Person of Christ, in Whom the Dignities find repose. Christ thus represents the means whereby concordance is achieved between God and man and the infinite or indefinite and unfulfilled multiplication of the likenesses of God’s “Reasons” in creation finds its limit and completion. However, in Christ there is found to be a multiplication of the concordance between infinite and finite. Of course, in Neoplatonic terms, endless multiplication represents the increasing and ongoing distancing of the many from the One, the desired return to which would thereby be frustrated. The same principle of parsimony, here aligned with the reditus ad Deum and applied to God’s outwardly spoken Word, is also applicable to the spoken and written words of mankind.

In the absence of Christ’s Incarnation, according to Llull in his De contemplatione Raymundi (August 1297), there would be no such terminus or repose, for the “Reasons” would endlessly aspire to reproduce their likenesses in creation and thus their multiplication would be interminable. The Reasons cannot achieve their telic destiny, their optimum activation and actualisation, in creation without the Incarnation for, states Llull, “God’s great goodness will always wish to multiply its likeness in its effect, and His greatness similarly, and so on for the other Reasons, and they would never be able to attain their chosen end”.  

---

128 ROL XIV.

129 ORL XVIII, I “Quomodo possimus Deum contemplari”, iii, 2, 400-401: “tua maxima bonitas
In Josep Rubio’s view, the *magna distantia* between words and things (*vox*/
*verbum* and *res*) of which Llull speaks above is exacerbated by the fact that
one has to pass through concepts (*intellectus/similitudines*) in the process of
signification. If I am correct in my interpretation, however, Llull attributes
much greater pre-eminence to internal discourse (including, though not
limited to, the operations of the three powers of the human intellective soul,
concepts or likenesses and logical structures) than Rubio would allow, and he
does so for reasons I shall now attempt to discuss. I would attribute Llull’s
position in these respects, at least in part, to his possible adoption of a Boethi-
an semantic theory, a theory whereby words signify either primarily thoughts
and only mediately things or immediately the thoughts which conceptualise
things.

We should note, therefore, that the thought and writings of Ramon Llull bear
a distinctive relationship to the so-called “semantic triangle” consisting of *in-
tellectus, res* and *verbum* (or *vox*), namely, thoughts, things and spoken words,
as well as to the three types of speech (i. e. mental speech, spoken speech and
written speech) attributed by Boethius to the Peripatetics and endorsed by him
in his second commentary on *Peri hermeneias*, the first type of which, though
not explicitly mentioned in that work by Aristotle himself, does appear, in
fact, in the latter’s *Analytica posterioria*, which states (in translation):

[... for demonstration, like syllogism, is concerned not with external but with
internal discourse, and it is always possible to object to the former, but not al-
ways possible to do so to the latter [...].]

Internal and external discourse are discussed in this passage in the context
of the distinction between a hypothesis (i.e. a *suppositio* or *radix posita*)—a
provable proposition assumed without proof and accepted by one’s interlocu-

---

130 Rubio (2017a, 40).

131 An. post. I, 10, 76b24-7; English translation in Aristotle (1966, 72-73). Note, however, that Jon-
athan Barnes translates the terms “external” and “internal discourse” as “external argument” and “argument
in the soul”/“internal argument”, respectively; cf. Aristotle (1995c, 124). Note also that the translation of
this text by Gerard of Cremona (from the Arabic) renders the terms as *sermo exterior/exterior ratio*
and *ratio intrinseca*, respectively, while that of James of Venice and the recension of William of Moerbeke coincide
in their renderings of *exterior/exterior ratio* and *ad eam que est in anima/interius/interior ratio*, also re-
spectively; cf. Aristoteles Latinus (1968, 207; 24; 296, respectively). The pagination in the following four
quotations refers respectively to the Latin versions of James of Venice, Gerard of Cremona and William
of Moerbeke.
tor—and a postulate (here considered illegitimate, i.e. a *petitio/quaeestio*), this postulate being the same assumption made when the interlocutor either has no opinion or a contrary one to the person making that assumption. Further distinctions are drawn between a) hypotheses and definitions (or “terms”), insofar as the latter only need to be understood; and b) between hypotheses, illegitimate postulates and definitions, the former two being either universal or particular, the latter neither. What should also be noted is that, for Aristotle, hypotheses constitute propositions (insofar as they make assertions regarding a thing’s existence or non-existence) while definitions do not. Whether Llull would have opted for the previously mentioned Anselmian or the Aristotelian construal of definitions is of less importance than the fact that they would both have been suggestive to him of the possibility of a “speech of the mind” that was, at least potentially, universal and demonstrative.

In the above respect, it should first be pointed out that in Llull’s system hypotheses (namely, the Articles of Faith) are susceptible of and form the object of proof and indeed require such, given that they are in most cases not accepted by his interlocutors. As Anthony Bonner makes clear, however, Llull operates neither precisely according to the Euclidean axiomatic model whereby “pre-established principles are used to prove successive new principles (theorems)”, nor, would I say, to the Aristotelian model of demonstration as outlined above. Bonner shows that Llull does not work from principles to the thing to be proved, but, in fact, moves in the opposite direction, testing the very hypotheses against those principles.

However, in my view, when read in terms of the Aristotelian theory of demonstration presented in the *Posterior Analytics*, Llull’s “hypotheses”, in

---


137 For an extended survey of the influence of this work, among others, on Llull’s thinking and methods, see Ruiz Simon (1999).
fact, start out as “postulates”, given, at best, that they are inimical to the beliefs of his (Muslim and Jewish) interlocutors; they gain the status of “hypotheses” only when those same interlocutors have assimilated and accepted two crucial (though in the second case, well-concealed) features of the Arts of Llull’s “Quaternary Phase”, namely: a) the unaccompanied role played by F and G (memory remembering and intellect understanding, respectively) from Figure S, unaccompanied, that is, by either D (will loving) or H (will hating), on the grounds of a prior supposition of N (the combined acts of K, L and M, i.e. memory forgetting, intellect not knowing and will loving or hating, again respectively); and b) the presence of the sub-principles of “Possibility and Impossibility” (alongside those of “Non-being” and “Being”) under the letter “P” representing “Doubt” in the “Black Triangle” of Figure T (wherein “O” = “Affirmation” and “Q” = “Negation”). These two features are intended to ensure as much receptiveness in an interlocutor potentially hostile to the—for Llull, at least—true suppositions or hypotheses of the Christian faith.

Second, it should be noted that proof of such hypotheses rests upon the axioms of his system (at least in the form outlined by Bonner above), namely, the divine attributes or “Dignities”, at least when in the form of propositions such as “God is good”, “God is great”, “God is eternal”, and so on. These Dignities are themselves interconvertible or, as Llull calls it, “equiparable”, such that it is also true that “God’s goodness is great”, “God’s goodness is eternal”, “God’s greatness is good”, “God’s greatness is eternal”, “God’s eternality is good”, “God’s eternality is great”, and so on, and they can, therefore, be used in the loftiest form of proof, demonstratio per aequiparantiam, of Llull’s own devising.

Third, it should be stated that this Aristotelian assimilation between demonstration, syllogistic and “internal discourse”, may well have served as an additional spur to that found in St Augustine’s De trinitate, Book XV, whe-

---

138 Cf. Bonner (2007, 46, 81-82). Bonner points to the oppositional nature of the pairing “Demonstration—Hypothesis” in Llull’s Figure X on p. 82 of this study and in a footnote adverts the reader to Llull’s use of a method involving demonstratio per hypothesim, a method which, in my view, would seem to suggest that, for Llull, the terms of this opposition were not incommensurable. Cf. also Rubio (1997, 92-101); and Ruiz Simon (1999, 217, n. 234).

139 Demonstratio per aequiparantiam was a technique of demonstration to which Llull devoted an entire work, the Libr de demonstracione per aequiparantiam (March 1305), a technique based on the equivalence of the divine Dignities and felt by Llull to be superior to the two traditional scholastic methods of proof, namely, demonstratio propter quid (from cause to effect) and demonstratioquia (from effect to cause), the latter of which was considered to be the weakest form of proof. The technique under the above name first came to prominence in Llull’s Ars demonstrativa (ca. 1283; hereafter AD), though for its earlier use in his oeuvre and its possible connections to a category of relatives identified by Peter of Spain, cf. Bonner (2007, 66, n. 83).
rein we find expressed, in the context of a distinction between *scientia* and *sapientia*, the notion of a *verbum mentis*, namely, a source for the idea of the pre-linguistic concepts of “internal discourse”. In this Book, Augustine clearly states (in translation) that: “[f]or although there were no words spoken, at any rate, he who thinks speaks in his heart”, and “[f]or the thought which is formed by the thing which we know, is the word which we speak in the heart”.\(^\text{140}\) We also note Augustine’s combining of both his visual and his verbal models of thought or “internal discourse” in another section of the same chapter, wherein he makes a direct equation within the human spiritual soul between not only vision and speech, but also vision and hearing.\(^\text{141}\) All three references are compatible with Llull’s positioning of *cogitatio* among the spiritual senses.

The manner in which Llull responds to the semantic triangle and to the three types of speech is complex, however. Llull engages primarily with what he perceives to be the fundamental misunderstanding on the part of his interlocutors, namely, those he aims to proselytise, at all three semantic levels—conceptual, linguistic and real—of the articles of the Christian faith. Llull seeks to disseminate his arguments and the truths they not only convey and signify, but also demonstrate, among both Christians and non-Christians within the bounds of Christendom, but also among non-believers in distant lands.

For Llull, therefore, the “semantic triangle” generates a problematic which extends to the diversity of languages after Babel, a problem he specifically seeks to resolve via the formation of language schools designed to train future missionaries educated in his own Art to speak what he calls “Eastern languages”, to which his desire that Latin should come to occupy the place of a universal *lingua franca* acts as a complement or even serves to supplant. The third complexity consists in the ontological, theological and gnoseological status of internal thoughts, viz. “mental speech”, the spoken word and the written text and their relative priority in the pursuit of transmitting the truths of the Christian faith, refuting falsehoods and fostering adherence to man’s

\(^{140}\) Augustine (1997a, 464), *De trinitate*, XV, 10, 17; and *PL* 42: 1069-1070, here 1070: “Nam etsi verba non sonent, in corde suo dicit utique qui cogitat”; and Augustine (1997a, 468), ibid., XV, 10, 19; and *PL* 42: 1071: “Formata quippe cogitatio ab ea re quam scimus, verbum est quod in corde dicimus.”

\(^{141}\) Augustine (1997a, 468), ibid., XV, 10, 18; and *PL* 42: 1070-1071, here 1070: “Nec tamen quia dicimus locutiones cordis esse cogitationes, ideo non sunt etiam visiones exortae de notitiae visionibus, quando verae sunt. Foris enim cum per corpus haec fiunt, aliud est locutio, aliud visio: intus autem cum cogitamus, utrumque unum est. Sicut auditio et visio duo quaedam sunt inter se distantia in sensibus corporis, in animo autem non est aliud atque aliud videre et audire: ac per hoc cum locutio foris non videatur, sed potius audiatur, locutiones tamen interiores, hoc est, cogitationes visas dixit a Domino sanctum Evangelium, non auditas.”
“first intention”. The fourth complexity, on the other hand, which has a partial overlap with the third such, consists in a range of cognitive, psychological and gnoseological concerns relating to the human intellective soul and its interaction with the interoceptive senses and the imagination. This last complexity, moreover, also concerns that very soul’s involvement in the expression of thoughts and desires, viz. mental states, theological and catechetical contents and universal and particular truths, all viewed within an ethical and moral context, through the operations of Llull’s newly christened sixth sense, namely, affatus or oral communication.

2.3. The Llibre dels àngels and the Liber de locutione angelorum

In today’s terms, Llull’s perhaps most arcane treatment of “internal discourse” occurs in Distinction IV of a short work written most probably during the same period in which he composed Blaquerna, namely, the Llibre dels àngels (1276-1283 ?). This particular Distinction, the fourth of six, treats of the speech of angels both within and between themselves, as well as with human persons.

Equally arcane, if we accept such a judgement, is his much later work, the Liber de locutione angelorum, composed in Montpellier in May 1312. This latter work directed against the “Latin Averroists”, seeks to replace what its author calls “positive knowledge”, based on faith, with scientia causativa, itself based on reason, such scientia causativa closely resembling the knowledge, free from sensory or imaginative elements, possessed by angels. One of the chief aims of the Liber de locutione angelorum is, in fact, to combat the Peripatetic axiom according to which nihil in intellectu quod non fuerit prius in sensu (“Nothing is in the intellect that was not previously in the senses”), namely, the argument in favour of knowledge as abstraction from sensible objects, on the grounds that angels have innate knowledge of God above and beyond the senses and the imagination and that their conceptum mentis or thought (a term strongly recalling Anselm’s conceptio mentis, mentioned earlier) is to be equated with their speech.142

As the earlier work shows, angelic knowledge with respect to God, at least,

142 Carles Llinàs i Puente devotes a chapter to angelic speech in his comprehensive study of the role of angels in Llull’s thought, though for the purposes of his book concentrates exclusively upon the latter’s Liber de locutione angelorum, to the detriment, I feel, of the Llibre dels àngels, which, as the more seminal text, cannot be so easily overlooked; cf. Llinàs i Puente (2000, 333-348).
is produced in and by the well-ordered operation of the powers of the angelic intellective soul in its contemplation of its Creator, being thus supervenient upon angelic “internal discourse”, which itself provides a pre-eminently for the kind of rational, demonstrative knowledge Llull seeks to achieve in his Art in the case of human beings.\footnote{ORL XXI, 354ff.}

Llull gives a retrospectively self-referential and metaphysical description of that in which a good angel’s mental speech consists, namely, that it “follows the order of its essence and the nature of its being and its power as regards properties and conditions, receiving an influence from the divine Dignities”,\footnote{Ibid., 354-355: “segueix l’orde de sa essència e la natura de sa entitat e de sa virtut en propietats, condicions, reebent influència de les divines dignitats”.} all the terms of which he has already defined in either the Prologue or Distinction II.\footnote{Ibid., 307-09; 318-342.} A good angel’s mental speech, therefore, consists in the “well-ordered disposition” of the acts of the powers pertaining to an angelic soul with respect to the concordance God’s justice requires of those same powers by virtue of the divine Dignities, while a wicked angel’s mental speech, on the other hand, consists in the contrary of all the foregoing.\footnote{Ibid., 355.}

We now turn to angelic speech or discourse proper. Llull discusses this topic under three main headings: first, the “internal discourse” of angels;\footnote{Ibid., 354-355.} second, the discourse of angels among themselves;\footnote{Ibid., 355-359.} and, third, the discourse angels maintain with people.\footnote{Ibid., 359-365.} Under the second heading he discusses both the discourse which good angels maintain with each other and that which wicked angels maintain likewise. Under the third heading he distinguishes the speech of angels to the righteous; that of angels to the unrighteous; that of devils to the righteous; and that of devils to the unrighteous, thus covering all logical possibilities.

Llull first specifies that the purpose of angelic inter-communication between good angels is so that an angel may be known and loved by another in respect of what it loves regarding God and His works by means of its properties.\footnote{Ibid., 356-357.} In doing so, Llull indicates that he is not only discussing the nature but
also the function of angelic speech, the very need for which was not always accepted by medieval theologians.\footnote{Ibid., 356.} He also explains that angels which are closer to divine majesty can communicate their intellect, will and concordance to angels which are not so close thereto.\footnote{Id.} Llull emphasises here the greater ease of understanding between angels, which are purely intellectual beings, than is the case in man between sensible speech and the intellect.\footnote{Id.}

In discussing the communication between good angels and righteous men, Llull alludes to the disputed question of whether angels require a medium of communication.\footnote{For discussion of this point, cf. above § 2.1.} His treatment of this matter begins with a negative analogy between human understanding which, through the medium of the intellect, understands perceptible words (\textit{paraules sensu\textsc{las}}), and the understanding of angels which:

> without any medium, though with God’s grace, understands and receives the perceptible things and the words which people say, with which people angels speak according to what they understand by the former’s words, by communicating with them and participating in the greatness of their goodness, power and so on.\footnote{Ibid., 360: “sens tot miyià, enperò ab gràcia de Déu, entén e pren les coses sensu\textsc{las} e les paraules que ls hòmens dien, ab los quals hòmens parlen los àngels segons so que entenen per lurs paraules, comunicantsse ab aquels, participants la granea de lur bonea, poder e cètera”.

What Llull shows here is that, unlike people, in whom communication occurs with the aid of the imagination and intellect acting upon perceptible words, it is at the level of the goodness, power, etc., in which both angels and people participate, that their communication occurs.

The first three Distinctions of Llull’s later \textit{De locutione angelorum}, however, exemplify angelic internal discourse as conducted between the Archangels Michael and Gabriel, conducted, that is, in accordance with certain of the features of Llull’s \textit{AGU} of 1305-1308.\footnote{ROL XVI, 217-231.} In Distinction IV of this short work Llull treats the mental and vocal speech angels perform with people. Llull here contends with respect to angelic mental discourse with humans, however, that people who understand the truth in the two angels’ syllogisms are in commu-
nication with good angels, while those who fail to do so (such as Latin Averroists and “Saracens”) are in communication with wicked angels or demons.\footnote{Ibid., 231-236.}

He thus equates the understanding and loving of true syllogisms by virtuous humans with acts of internal discourse likewise addressed to good angels. We can conclude from the above, therefore, that one of the (primary) functions of human internal discourse is none other than discourse with good angels, who induce virtues in worthy people, while their wicked counterparts induce vices in wicked people.\footnote{Ibid., 236.} In fact, in his *Llibre dels àngels*, written some thirty years earlier, Llull had gone so far as to express the complete coincidence between the mental discourse of the unrighteous and the very words of demons, the speech of the latter being “specified by means of [a person’s] mental speech in the acts of [the soul’s] powers”.\footnote{ORL XXI, 364: “especificades ab les paraules de sa pensa en los actus de les potencies”.

\footnote{Cf. Plato (2000, 1224-1291, here 1241).}

It is clear from the *Llibre dels àngels*, at the very least, that Llull draws upon and combines suggestive elements from the writings of St Augustine regarding pre-linguistic speech and the powers of the soul in order to formulate his theory of “internal discourse” with respect to angels, a theory wherein there is precisely communication at a pre-linguistic level between the intellectual powers of the angelical soul, this being a model which Llull also proposes for the highest levels of human “internal discourse”, namely, consideration, cogitation, prayer and contemplation.

### 3. Ramon Llull and the Greek tradition

#### 3.1. *Logos endiathetos* and *logos prophorikos*

Claude Panaccio has traced the origins of the notion of thought as a kind of “internal discourse” from a brief passage in Plato’s *Timaeus*, 37b, a passage which associates such discourse (*logos*) with a form of non-articulated soundless and internal utterance, and which one recent translation renders as being “borne along without utterance or sound within the self-moved thing”.\footnote{Cf. Plato (2000, 1224-1291, here 1241).} This work had been partially translated into Latin during the fourth century CE by Calcidius and was also the subject of a commentary by the fifth-century Neoplatonist Proclus (of which latter the poem in Book III of Boethius’s *De consolatione philosophiae* provided a summary), and thus would have been...
known to medieval thinkers. In Panaccio’s view, however, for Plato, thought remains bound up with its articulation within a particular language, even if uttered internally in silence.

Passing over many of the details of Panaccio’s account, by the time St John of Damascus (ca. 675-749 CE), there had already formed an accepted distinction among schools of Greek philosophy between logos prophorikos (“the uttered word”) and logos endiathetos (“the word remaining within”). In its twelfth-century translation by Burgundio of Pisa, John of Damascus’s De fide orthodoxa, became the most direct historical connection between the Greek notion of logos endiathetos and the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century scholastics. This text transmits, via Maximus the Confessor’s Ad presbyterum Mariumn, a theory of the five movements of the mind first found in St Irenaeus of Lyon’s Adversus haereses. It is worth pausing to enumerate these:

1) the first movement of the mind in relation to a given object is called ennoia or “thought”;  
2) when this movement persists, intensifies and takes hold of the entire soul, it is called enthumēsis or “consideration”;  
3) when such consideration lingers on the same object and is, as it were, put to the test, it is given the name phronēsis or “reflection”;  

---

161 Panaccio (1999, 30).
162 For the parallel distinction found in the writings of both John of Damascus and al-Farabi between an innermost light of the mind and the specific intellectual products thereby illuminated, namely, reflections, deliberations and meditations, see Panaccio (1999, 82). Of particular relevance to Llull’s case is the fact that al-Farabi identifies a term (al-nutq), which corresponds to logos endiathetos, as well as a rational faculty itself or “light of the mind” whereby one may distinguish good from evil and acquire concepts, not to mention the sciences and the arts, cf. id.
163 Ibid., 79.
164 Maximus the Confessor (1865, 580-662).
166 The translators of Ammonius’s commentary on the Peri hermeneias translate this term as follows: notitia (Moerbeke); cognitio (Anonymus); notio (Sylvanius, Rasarius); while Themistius’s De anima renders it as: conceptio, conceptus and intellectus; cf. Ammonius (1961, lxxxii). Other senses associated with this term include: intentio, meditatio, mens, ratio, sensus and sententia; cf. ibid., 507. That there is overlap between the Latin senses of meditatio and cogitatio can be seen in the fact that the former is a rendering of both ennoia and epinoia, the latter of both dianoia and epinoia; cf. ibid., 483 and 494.
167 The term enthumēsis can be rendered in Latin as consideratio.
168 The term phronēsis can be rendered in Latin as prudentia; cf. ibid., 514.
4) when such reflection extends its range, it becomes boulê (?) or “deliberation”;

5) when this deliberation grows and spreads out further, it is called dialogismos or “reasoning”, which is equally and justifiably called logos endiathetos or “internal discourse”, from which springs logos prophorikos or externally uttered speech.

John of Damascus’s own classification differs slightly from the above. Panaccio notes, however, that the Latin translation of this text (cited in the previous note) has, following on from the fourth movement of deliberation or consilium, a spreading out of this latter into a “discursive plurality”, which it calls cogitatio, and which corresponds to the “internal discourse” of logos endiathetos, that is to say, a pre-linguistic intellectual discursivity or “mental speech”.

We know with some certainty, however, that Llull would not have had access to the De fide orthodoxa or the works of Boethius until at least his first visit to Montpellier in 1275, and, more probably, during the period of his residence there between 1278 and 1283, when he composed the AD and Blaquerna in that city.

---

169 The term boulê can be rendered in Latin as consilium, i.e. ‘counsel’; cf. ibid., 506; cf. also following note.

170 Irenaeus of Lyon (1857, 0742C-0743A): “Prima enim motio ejus de aliquo, ennoia appellatur; perseverans autem et aucta, et universam apprehendens animam, enthymesis vocatur. Haec autem enthymesis multum temporis faciens in eodem, et velut probata, sensatio nominatur. Haec autem sensatio in multum dilatata, consilium facta est; augmentum autem et motus in multum dilatatus consilii, cogitationis exspernat: quae etiam in mente perseverans, verbum rectissime appellabitur; ex quo emissibilis emittitur verbum” (emphasis added); cf. Panaccio (1999, 85). The passage in which this classification arises has been translated into English as follows: “The first movement of mind in relation to some objects is called ‘notion’. When this continues, strengthens, and possesses the entire soul, it is called ‘comprehensive thinking’. When this continues, strengthens, and possesses the entire soul, it is called ‘comprehensive thinking’. In turn, this, when it spends much time on the same object and is so to speak tested, becomes ‘acceptance’. This acceptance greatly amplified becomes ‘deliberation’. When this deliberation grows and is amplified it becomes ‘internal discourse’, from which comes the uttered word”, in Grant (1997, 81), here slightly amended. It is worth noting the discrepancies of terminology between the above translation and that provided (in French) in Panaccio (1999, 85), as stated above. For a different English translation of this passage, cf. Irenaeus of Lyon (1867/2001, 970 and note).

171 Panaccio (1999, 90). In the opening chapter of Llull’s Blaquerna, we find Evast deliberating upon his choice of the order of matrimony (see Blaquerna, ch. 1, § 4).

172 For his AD, cf. OS I, 273-521; ROL XXXII.
3.2. The Romanç d’Evast e Blaquerna

With reference now to the latter work, composed between 1276-1283, I believe that it is possible to maintain that Ramon Llull specifically endorsed something very akin to the *logos endiathetos/prophorikos* distinction. In this work, “cogitation” forms one of a group of terms which require consideration apart: namely, those relating to varieties or levels of thought. The terms in question are the following: *pensar/pensament* (lit. “to think”/“thought”); *considerar/consideració* (lit. “to consider”/“consideration”); *deliberar/deliberació* (lit. “to deliberate”/“deliberation”); and *cogitar/cogitació* (lit. “to cogitate”/“cogitation” or “to reflect upon”/“reflection”).

These five verb-noun pairings are used, it would seem, in a systematic and ascending way by Llull. I believe Llull’s deliberate use of such terms, however, is key to understanding his approach to the various levels of thought and the respective approximations thereof to that of “internal discourse” (Lat. *cogitatio*). We should note, however, that in the final part of his *Oracions de Ramon* from 1290, entitled “On the Doctrine of Loving God”, Llull makes it abundantly clear that the thought, consideration and cogitation which he calls upon his readers to exercise in respect of the preceding units of his text, are themselves subordinate to the overall aim of increasing that reader’s love for God.173

A very early work by Llull, the *Oracions e contemplacions del intellect* (1274-1276 ?), is also crucial for an understanding of Llull’s overall intellectual project insofar as he explicitly asserts therein the insufficiency of his first Art, the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, dating from around 1274, in respect of lofty matters of contemplation.174 So, if prayer and contemplation, that is, the objects of human “internal discourse”, are themselves superior to Llull’s Art, angelic “internal discourse” itself must be all the more so. Llull, nevertheless, expresses frustration concerning the limits of human cogitation in Chapter 168 of *LC*, wherein is manifested his desire in prayer for a broadening and extension of the limits of human thought, for the sake of fuller contemplation of God.175 Perhaps he went on to seek this desideratum under the

173 ORL XVIII, 378-379.
174 ORL XVIII, 249: “Aprés que l enteniment hac contemplat segons que demunt es dit, sentí en sí que no s tenia per content de ço que tant solament hac considerat e descorregut en la Art que havia abreuyada de trobar veritat, e per virtut de Deu, esforçà s a puyar entendre molt altament, dient al voler e al membrar de ses sors, estes paraules per metàfora.”
175 ORL IV, 416: “Lo vostre servidor, Sènyer Deus, vos prega e us adora e us clama mercè de totes ses forces, que vos a la sua contemplacio examplets e estenats ses termenacions, per tal que per l examplament d aquelles cresca e multiplic sa gloria e sa vertut, contemplant en vos, esperant de vos gloria e benediccio.”
influence of his thoughts on internal human and angelic “internal discourse”, and the application of these to prayer and contemplation, in the structures and alphabet of his progressive Arts, here only faintly anticipated.

We should also note in passing that Llull’s use of the term cogitation, namely, the highest level of thought, is completely “democratic”, given that in Chapter 66 of Blaquerna such a level is seen to be fully within the reach of even rural shepherds. Equally worthy of note is the fact that, in his Vita co-aetanea, dictated towards the very end of his life in 1311, Llull recollects and construes his formative “conversion experience” prior to the composition of any of his works, a “conversion” brought about by repeated nocturnal visions of the crucified Christ, in terms of his “secum tota illa nocte cogitando tractans”, that is to say, of his—in this instance, pained—“internal discourse”.

4. Conclusion

In the most general terms possible, then, I think it is possible to chart an evolution in Ramon Llull’s thought on the issue of “internal discourse” during the period between 1271/1272 and 1290. I would like to suggest that from 1271/1272 itself to 1278 Llull endorses a more Stoic, Aristotelian and Augustinian “theory of signs” (or semiotics), though one already combined with Neoplatonic elements (such as the belief in the causal and natural priority of mental over spoken speech), a theory in which, strictly speaking, spoken words signify thoughts alone (or in the Stoics view a lekton or “sayable”) and thought itself is to be considered pre-linguistic. Following his first stay in Montpellier, that is to say, between 1278-1283, however, I believe that there are signs of an increasing influence of Boethian, Anselmian, Victorine and Damasene elements amounting to a “theory of signification” (or semantics). In this latter theory, such words, again strictly speaking, signify thoughts principally and things secondarily, insofar as words, for Boethius, at least, signify things through the medium of thought, where that thought functions as a mirror wherein similitudines or likenesses of things are reflected and it is those likenesses as signified rather than the external things themselves which are apprehended by the rational soul, albeit that those external things feature as the content of thoughts. Here Boethius is, of course, relying upon Aristotle’s

---

176 NEORL VIII, 303-304; (English version) Llull (2016, 293).
177 Llull (2010, 32).
178 The Latin rendering of to lekton is locutio, for which, in the context of St Anselm’s and St Augustine’s writings, cf. above, §§ 1; 2; 2.2, and n. 140; cf. also Ammonius (1961, 53, 494).
definition of “spoken sounds” as “symbols of affections in the soul”, these “affections”, unlike the “spoken sounds” and the “written marks” by which these sounds are symbolised, being, in Aristotle’s words, as previously mentioned, “the same for all”, as are the “actual things” of which such “affections” are likenesses. It is at this stage, I believe, that we see the first intimations of a more linguistic construal of thought on Llull’s part.

Such “affections in the soul” are generally held to denote thoughts and as such are passive, at least as considered in the Peri hermeneias, though Aristotle’s De anima also speaks of the possibility of the consideration of thought (or nous) both in active and in passive terms.179 What we find, in Llull, in fact, is that not only the Godhead, but also the entirety of creation, thought included, is, in the more mature stages of his thought, suffused with active, passive and conjunctive elements, which he calls “correlatives”, and that, possibly taking Aristotle’s account in De anima to heart, this applies equally to “thought”.

A third stage in Llull’s thought is represented by the period 1287-1289, wherein Llull may have fully assimilated influences from Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, Bonaventure, Aquinas and Proclus. But whereas Boethius may have only had indirect access to the writings of Proclus, it has been established that Llull, via the corpus Dionysiacum he consulted during his stay in Paris between 1287-1289, would have been familiar with Proclus’s thought and would have been able to supplement Boethius and his own possible reading of Boethius’s Commentarii with the Procline notion, expressed in the latter’s In Platonis Parmenidem commentaria, that names are first and foremost likenesses of Platonic Forms, that is to say, of Ideas, and only secondarily of perceptible things.180 It is Llull’s supplementation of Boethius’s commentaries upon Aristotle’s De interpretatione with his readings in the works of the above-mentioned writers, I believe, which serve as one of the foundations for Llull’s dramatic shift in cosmology in the period leading up to 1290, the

179 Aristotle (1995a, 684), De anima, III, 5, 430a14-17: “[...] thought, as we have described it, is what it is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is another which is what it is by virtue of making all things: this is a sort of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential colours into actual colours”; “[...] existit unus intellectus, qui corrispondet [...] quia fit omnia, et alter [qui fiat] omnia, [estque] species quaedem habitus simili modo, quo lumen; nam etiam lumen vero quandam sensu efficit, ut colores, qui in potentia sunt, actu existant”, in Aristotle (1957, 255; here slightly amended).

180 Proclus (1987, 220), English translation; In Platonis Parmenidem commentaria, IV, Commentary, 851, II, 7-9: “[...] if names are images in words of the objects to which they apply, they refer primarily to immaterial Forms, and derivatively to sensible things [...]."
time at which his Art was thoroughly recast, and the very changes such a shift necessitated in his Art.

I trust that I have not given the impression of believing that, by stressing the natural and causal priority of thought and its active role in establishing the conditions of possibility for communication, if not in constituting the very medium wherein and whereby the transmission of concepts or passiones animae concerning things, both internal and external, are articulated in external discourse, Ramon Llull is advocating any kind of telepathic understanding of communication. Rather, I hope to have suggested that, by means of his increasing familiarity with tradition, during the years 1271/1272-1289, at the latest, Llull was able to fashion a coherent and innovative response to that tradition, while examining the question of whether “internal discourse” was indeed fundamentally pre-linguistic, not to mention, non-vocal.

Precedents for the belief that such was the case can easily be found in Augustine’s De Trinitate, Book XV, while precedents for the fact that such was the case can easily be found in Aristotle’s logical works. If these logical structures could precede language, then so could the equally logical structures of Ramon Llull’s early system of thought as employed in their principal application to the practices of prayer and contemplation and the latter’s subsequent written exposition. Rather than advocating a form of telepathy, then, what Llull seems to be doing is encouraging the readers of his written word (and the audiences to his spoken utterances) to pass beyond the realms of that written or spoken word in order to arrive at that of intellectual thought.

Reading the works of Ramon Llull is reading the written, printed or electronic marks of his own “internal discourse”. Whether this discourse be addressed to God, so often apostrophised and contemplated in his earlier works, to Christ, to the Mother of God, to the angels, saints, confessors or Fathers of the Church, invoked in prayer as these are, to his son, as is the case with one work, to his sources or to his readership, it is united by the growing belief that, if a concept can function as a sign, then thought itself may be possessed of its own ordinatio ad alterum.

Finally, a few comments should be made regarding Gadamer’s analysis as mentioned at the start of this article. First, Gadamer’s counter-Enlightenment and comparative interpretation of the relation of logos and verbum is ahistorical, at least from the viewpoint of texts produced during the Middle Ages, for the simple reason of the virtual absence of the Platonic corpus itself from the purview of medieval writers. Elements of Platonic thought, as we know,
of course, were transmitted indirectly to the protagonists of High Scholasticism, not least through the Neoplatonic tradition (e.g. Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, the Pseudo-Dionysius), though in Ramon Llull’s case his familiarity with the two latter authors would not occur until 1287-1289, i.e. the end of the period studied in this article. Second, Gadamer’s equation of *intellectus* with the term “reason” is inappropriately applied to the Middle Ages, insofar as it is anachronistic. Third, his equation (or that of his translators’) of *cogitatio* with mere ‘thoughtfulness’ constitutes, in a medieval context, a desacralisation of a term more closely associated with meditation and, thus, prayer. And finally, the schematism of his account is incompatible with the referential complexity and specificity of the texts produced by scholastic writers, not least by Ramon Llull himself, who draws upon a wide range of sources and reconfigures these and accommodates them to one another in a way which suits his own particular—contemplative, epistemological and proselytising—purposes.

Having said this, however, Gadamer’s hermeneutics *does* offer the possibility of viewing St Augustine’s novel perspective on the relations between *verbum cordis* and language (i.e. thought and speech) as a paradoxical ‘advance’ with respect to the reversionary step made by Aristotelian-Scholasticism vis-à-vis the latter’s return to the classical concept of *logos* and the consequent reduction of language to a system of signs (i.e. a *semiotics*). On this reading, therefore, Llull’s writings on “internal discourse” themselves, having drawn deeply from the well of Augustinianism, would represent a reprise of this novel approach, considered from the viewpoint of the modern philosophy of language.\(^{181}\) I hope to have made clear in this article that the texts and contexts in and from which Llull conveys his thoughts on such matters are even richer and more complex than the Gadamerian analysis would allow.

**Abbreviations**

All individual Lullian works are cited from the following series: *MOG*, NEORL, ORL and ROL, for which, see below, unless otherwise stated (see “Bibliography. Primary Sources”).


---

\(^{181}\) I owe this final insight to one of the anonymous referees of this article.


BPhMAC = Bibliotheca Philosophorum Medii Aevii Catalanoniae, Josep Batalla and Alexander Fidora (dirs.) (Obrador Edèndum – Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona – Universitat Rovira i Virgili, 2005ff.).

*Blaquerna* = *Romanç d’Evast e Blaquerna*, Albert Soler and Joan Santanach (eds.), NEORL VIII (2009); (English version) Llull (2016).

CCCM = Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis (Turnhout: Brepols, 1967ff.).

EL = *Estudios Lulianos*, Palma (1957-1990. See *SL*).


NEORL = Nova Edició de les Obres de Ramon Llull, Fernando Domínguez Reboiras et al. (eds.) (Palma de Mallorca: Patronat Ramon Llull, 1990ff).


QADS = Ramon Lull, *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles*, Ivo Salzinger (ed.), *MOG* IV, iii (17-224).


SL = *Studia Lulliana* (olim *Estudios Lulianos*) (Palma, 1991ff.).

SMR = *Studia Monographica et Recensiones* (Palma: Schola Lullistica).

ST = Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*.

### Bibliography

**Primary Sources**


Anselm (1853) = Anselmus Cantuariensis, *De divinitatis essentia monologium*, *PL* 158, cols. 0141C-0224A.


— (1980d) = *Quaestio disputata de veritate*, in *S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera


Augustine (1841) = Augustinus, De trinitate, PL 42, cols. 0819-1098.


— (1997a) = St Augustine, La Trinité, Œuvres de Saint Augustin. 2ème série:


Ferrer (forthcoming) = Vicent Ferrer, Tractatus de suppositionibus, Josep Batalla (intr. and tr.), Josep Batalla and Elena de la Cruz Vergari (eds.), Robert D. Hughes (tr.), BPhMAC 4 (Santa Coloma de Queralt: Obrador Edèndum, forthcoming).

Hugh of St Victor (1854) = Hugo de S Victore, De sacramentis Christianae fidei, PL 176, cols. 0173-0618B.

Irenaeus of Lyon (1857) = Irenaeus, Adversus haereses, PG 7, cols. 437-973; 7b, cols. 1117-1122.

— (1867/2001) = ANF01, The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus, Philip Schaff (tr.) (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 2001), pp. 841-1391; see below, “Electronic resources”.

Irenaeusus of Lyon (1857) = Irenaeus, Adversus haereses, PG 7, cols. 437-973; 7b, cols. 1117-1122.

— (1867/2001) = ANF01, The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus, Philip Schaff (tr.) (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 2001), pp. 841-1391; see below, “Electronic resources”.


Ferrer (forthcoming) = Vicent Ferrer, Tractatus de suppositionibus, Josep Batalla (intr. and tr.), Josep Batalla and Elena de la Cruz Vergari (eds.), Robert D. Hughes (tr.), BPhMAC 4 (Santa Coloma de Queralt: Obrador Edèndum, forthcoming).

Hugh of St Victor (1854) = Hugo de S Victore, De sacramentis Christianae fidei, PL 176, cols. 0173-0618B.

Irenaeus of Lyon (1857) = Irenaeus, Adversus haereses, PG 7, cols. 437-973; 7b, cols. 1117-1122.

— (1867/2001) = ANF01, The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus, Philip Schaff (tr.) (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 2001), pp. 841-1391; see below, “Electronic resources”.


Ferrer (forthcoming) = Vicent Ferrer, Tractatus de suppositionibus, Josep Batalla (intr. and tr.), Josep Batalla and Elena de la Cruz Vergari (eds.), Robert D. Hughes (tr.), BPhMAC 4 (Santa Coloma de Queralt: Obrador Edèndum, forthcoming).

Hugh of St Victor (1854) = Hugo de S Victore, De sacramentis Christianae fidei, PL 176, cols. 0173-0618B.

Irenaeus of Lyon (1857) = Irenaeus, Adversus haereses, PG 7, cols. 437-973; 7b, cols. 1117-1122.

— (1867/2001) = ANF01, The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus, Philip Schaff (tr.) (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 2001), pp. 841-1391; see below, “Electronic resources”.


**Secondary sources**


Colom Mateu (1973) = Miquel Colom Mateu, TOR, “Aspectes secundaris dins


Gustafsson and Hertzberg (2002) = Martin Gustafsson and Lars Hertzberg (eds.),


mental, la _locutio angelica_, selon Gilles de Rome et ses contemporains”, in Biard (2009), pp. 61-93.


— (2002) = Josep Maria Ruiz Simon, “‘En l’arbre són les fuyles per ço que y sia lo fruyt’: apunts sobre el rerafons textual i doctrinal de la distinció lul·liana entre la intenció primera i la intenció segona en els actes propter finem”, _SL_ 42 (2002), pp. 3-25.


gioso”, Jordi Pardo Pastor (coord.), pp. 157-178; see below, “Electronic resources”.

**Electronic resources**


